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“The present Age of Globalization must 
now be supplemented by an Age of 
Global Cooperation, where shared goals 
motivate diverse stakeholders to pull 








The progressive integration of the global economy has brought millions of 
people spectacular material success despite occasional lapses (such as excessive 
debt, excessive foreign currency exposure, and so on).
The gross world product – the sum of all the goods and services produced in 
this world – has risen approximately eightfold since 1950. And this growth 
is reaching a progressively larger proportion of the world´s population. While 
sustained improvements in material living standards used to be restricted to 
Europe, Japan, the U.S. and a few other countries, it is now reaching Brazil, 
China, India and other emerging market economies. 
One important reason for this material success is that over the past decades, 
more and more countries have discovered the magic of free markets. When 
people are compensated for the beneﬁ  ts they provide and pay for the costs 
they impose on others, then free markets enable them to satisfy their needs at 
minimum resource cost. Free market exchange is the engine that has lifted 300 
million Chinese and 200 million Indians out of extreme poverty in the past quarter 
of a century, while powering steady growth in the developed economies. 
So the world community is cooperating more and more successfully in the arena 
of the global economy. But when this cooperation engenders global problems 




Seeking Solutions to 
Global Problems
by Dennis J. Snower
Two giant transformations are shaping the current world order. One is the 
widespread integration of the global economy. The other is the progressive 
fragmentation of global society.
The integration of the global economy – globalization – is driven by free 
enterprise in global markets, creating a new worldwide division of labor. 
The fragmentation of global society is illustrated by our numerous failures of 
global problem solving. Towards the end of the ﬁ  rst decade of the 21st century, 
we ﬁ  nd ourselves confronted by a multiplicity of problems requiring a global 
response: climate change; rising disparities between the world´s richest and 
poorest countries; terrorism, ethnic conﬂ   ict and social fragmentation; food 
shortages, energy insecurity and water scarcity; ﬁ  nancial risk, the threat of 
protectionism and job insecurity.
Each of these problems requires cooperation among countries and disparate 
decision-makers, but in today´s multi-polar world, this cooperation has often 
been lacking. But the many current efforts at collaboration in tackling climate 
change, overcoming the global ﬁ  nancial crisis, dealing with water management, 
stimulating world trade and so on, highlight a renewed acknowledgement by 








￿  Free markets do not deal adequately with public goods, common 
  property and inequality. In the presence of public goods and common 
  property, people are not fully compensated or charged for the beneﬁ  ts 
  and costs they generate, and thus markets cease to work properly. 
  And while market forces have lifted hundreds of millions out of extreme 
  poverty, free markets do not necessarily tend to equalize the incomes, 
  educational opportunities or job security of people around the globe.
￿  Our predicament is that nowadays most of our serious global 
  problems are centered precisely on public goods, common property 
  and inequality. We have succeeded in exploiting the magic of markets, 
  but we often fail where those markets fail. 
To tackle our global problems, we need to supplement market forces through 
global cooperation among stakeholders in the political, business, academic, non-
governmental and civic communities. Our existing international organizations 
have an important role to play in achieving such cooperation. But they alone are 
not sufﬁ  cient for the simple reason that they are unable to redistribute incomes 
and allocate public goods and common property globally. Global cooperation 
among diverse stakeholders is necessary. 
Global Economic 
Solutions
The failure of the Kyoto Protocol to reduce greenhouse gas emissions; the collapse 
of the Doha Round of international trade negotiations; the persistent pockets of 
poverty, disease and political instability; the growing threats of military conﬂ  ict 
and nuclear proliferation – these are all symptoms of an underlying disease that 
may be called globusclerosis, a failure to solve global problems cooperatively. 
We face similar difﬁ   culties in achieving cooperation between generations, 
occupations and income classes. In particular, many countries struggle to 
support their ageing populations, to generate employment for their unskilled, 
to ﬁ  nance health care for their poor and to make their economic growth socially 
inclusive.
All these failures have something striking in common: they are all problems that 
free markets alone are powerless to solve:
￿ Some failures concern public goods. For example, there have been 
 insufﬁ   cient efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and contain the 
  spread of weapons, since the costs usually fall on those involved in the 
  efforts, whereas the beneﬁ  ts are shared by the entire world community.
￿ Other failures concern what is called the tragedy of the commons. For 
  example, deforestation, overgrazing and overﬁ  shing occur because people 
  lack the incentives to preserve common property resources.








On a purely scientiﬁ  c and technical level, we now have the competence – if we 
wished – to satisfy the basic needs of all people on this planet for food, shelter, 
sanitation and clothing, while at the same time preserving the earth´s topsoil, 
water supplies and natural habitats. We also have the wherewithal to provide 
basic education and skills worldwide. 
And most importantly, we have learned much in the past decades about how to 
help one another. Through the experiences of countless welfare states, foreign 
aid programs, NGO initiatives and philanthropic activities, we have learned that 
the most effective help is helping people to help themselves. Active labor market 
policies tend to be more effective than passive ones. Foreign aid that empowers 
the poor through skills and infrastructure has more transformative power than 
handouts from rich countries´ bureaucracies to poor countries´ governments. 
Much is intellectually and technically within our grasp. What is often missing 
is the will to global cooperation. Powerful interest groups, the temptation to 
“free-ride” on the efforts of others, ignorance about best practice policies and 
voting procedures that are not conducive to global problem solving, all play 
their part in generating globusclerosis. 
The will to global cooperation must be nurtured through shared visions of the 
future that induce diverse decision-makers to work together. 
Global Economic 
Solutions
National governments must help provide some of the necessary education, 
research and infrastructure. Businesses need to exploit technological advances 
to meet their customers´ needs. Academics and researchers need to analyze 
global problems and suggest unbiased blueprint solutions. Non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and social networks need to engage in public advocacy, 
demand accountability and create the personal connections on which trust can 
be built. Philanthropists and civic organizations can provide seed funding for 
implementing promising solutions. And so on in complex webs of interaction. 
Our global problems cannot be solved by any of these stakeholders acting in 
isolation. The present Age of Globalization must now to be supplemented by an 
Age of Global Cooperation, where shared goals motivate diverse stakeholders 
to pull in the same direction. 
It is not necessary that millions die each year from diseases for which cures 
are known. It is not necessary for globalization to bypass a third of the world´s 
population where help is needed most. It is not necessary that the poor be 
deprived of basic health services or the elderly of heat, food and care. It is not 







The Global Economic 
Symposium
The Global Economic Symposium (GES) 2008 convened at a time of deepening 
ﬁ  nancial crisis and rising concerns about the failures of multilateral problem 
solving. 
These failures include the inability of the world community to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions, to coordinate a global regulatory response to the disruption of 
global ﬁ  nancial markets, to help the world´s poorest countries, to provide energy 
security, to address the crisis of water shortages, to tackle social fragmentation, 
to prevent food prices from creating poverty and malnutrition, to enable poor 
countries to share knowledge, and much more.
The need to overcome these failures is becoming steadily more obvious and 
urgent, as witnessed in the intense efforts of the G20 countries to tackle the 
global ﬁ   nancial crisis and the many international deliberations on tackling 
climate change. 
Tackling these difﬁ  culties requires cooperation across countries and disparate 
decision-makers, but nowadays such cooperation is often not forthcoming. The 
world community is also frequently unable to achieve cooperation between 
generations and income classes. This is evident when countries strain to support 
their ageing populations, create employment for their unskilled and ﬁ  nance 
health care for their poor. 
Global Economic 
Solutions
In this multi-polar world, we know that there is no conception of the common 
good that is valid for all humankind – be it Enlightenment individualism, Middle 
and Far Eastern communitarianism, religious canons or ideological dogmas. 
Over the past century – after two world wars and countless other conﬂ  icts and 
atrocities – we have outgrown the presumption that there is one true, consistent 
and universally recognizable guide to human action. But we have also learned 
that this need not be an insuperable obstacle to global cooperation. 
Despite differences in ultimate values, there is still much that we, as a world 
community, can do to help one another achieve our disparate ends. And there 
is still vast, unexploited scope to promote solidarity in the pursuit of common 
goals – in dealing with climate change, promoting health and welfare, creating 
a safer world, tackling poverty and social fragmentation, beneﬁ  ting  from 
globalization, and much more. With due respect for our differences, we must 
ﬁ   nd this common ground through practical, measurable achievements. For 
this purpose, it is useful to have a neutral, creative space – removed from the 
everyday political constraints, lobby groups, institutional impediments – to 
think afresh about how global problems can be solved. The Global Economic 
Symposium (GES) is meant to be one such neutral, creative space.
We hope that the GES and the strategic dialogue it initiates, will contribute to 








Centering the debates in the GES on “Solutions” also emphasizes the two 
hallmarks of the forum, namely, that it is action-oriented – focusing on 
the question “what is to be done?” – and research-based – supported by 
state-of-the-art research, collected in the Virtual GES, the internet platform of 
the GES. In this sense, the GES 2008 aimed to be a solution forum, rather than 
a discussion forum. 
Our research base rests on the contributions of many experts. The researchers of 
the Kiel Institute for the World Economy provided a backbone of information, 
analysis, literature and more for the GES sessions. Each session was also 
supported by a distinguished team of international experts, who proposed 
panelists and gave feedback on the session content. Our distinguished advisory 
board provided strategic perspectives, innovative ideas and valuable contacts, 
thereby playing a role of overarching importance.
Global Economic 
Solutions
These global problems have some striking features in common: 
￿  The problems are interconnected. For example, the problem of climate change 
  is closely related to the problems of energy security and food security. 
  Some of the world´s poorest countries are trapped in a vicious cycle of disease, 
  poor education, violence, corruption and environmental degradation. These 
  interconnections are often ignored when policy-makers devise partial 
  responses to individual problems.
￿ They  cannot be solved by individual countries or stakeholders acting in 
  isolation. Instead, policy-makers, business leaders, academics and decision-
  makers in civil society must work together, across national and cultural 
  boundaries, to make progress.
￿  Since these diverse decision-makers are sovereign and independent, global 
  cooperation requires shared visions of the future that induce them to work 
  together voluntarily. The work must be embodied in concrete strategies to 
  achieve these visions. 
The GES 2008 aimed to make a contribution to creating these visions and 
formulating the resulting strategies. These contributions – small but useful steps 
in a constructive direction, supported by decision-makers from diverse walks of 
life – we label “Solutions”. This label is obviously not meant to imply exhaustive 
answers, but rather insights concerning concrete actions that could move us up 
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The Global Economic 
Solutions 
This document summarizes some prominent, innovative proposals generated by 
the GES 2008. The proposals achieved sizable agreement from the GES panelists 
and the wider GES community – although there were naturally dissenting voices, 
which are also given a hearing here. 
The proposals aim to provide shared visions of the future, which are meant to 
inspire cooperative efforts to address global problems. Where possible, they 
are also meant to be practical, feasible actions towards well-deﬁ  ned goals. 
The proposals are grouped into four broad areas, each subdivided into topics 







These insights should ideally satisfy a number of basic prerequisites:
￿  The insights should be internally consistent. All too often policies and strategies 
  are created in mental silos, each formulated without reference to the others. 
  For example, pension policies are often designed independently of employment 
  policies; redistribution policies are usually formulated independently of 
  growth-promoting measures; energy policies often conﬂ  ict with the objectives 
  of environmental policies. The GES strives to avoid this pitfall. It seeks 
  awareness of the interconnections among global problems, along with the 
  consequent interconnections among the policy and strategy responses. 
￿  They aim to serve the global public interest in the widest sense. In particular, 
  they are meant to be inclusive in geographical terms – relevant to the 
  countries of the world, whether developed or developing. They also aim to be 
  occupationally and socially inclusive – relevant to the business, policy-making, 
  academic and civic communities, to the employed and unemployed, and to 
  the rich and poor.
￿  They focus on actions that are meant to make the world a better place for 
  the next generation. This means that the underlying problems are lasting 
  ones, not those that are likely to disappear in a matter of years. The insights 
  involve the longer-term thinking that is often displaced by the urgent day-to-
 day issues with which business leaders, policy-makers and other 
  representatives of civil society must deal. They aim to provide a picture of the 




Needless to say, there is a lot of overlap among the four areas, for the simple 
reason that the GES places particular emphasis on global economic problems, 
many with environmental consequences, with important implications for global 
society, whose solutions can be addressed through global polity. Nevertheless, 
the reader may well ﬁ  nd the four areas useful for organizing ideas about global 
issues. 
The topics in the area of “The Global Economy” are primarily economic; those in 
the area of “The Global Polity” are primarily political; and so on. So, for example, 
the topic “Global policy responses to climate change” is ﬁ  rst and foremost an 
environmental issue, even though it clearly has massive economic, social and 
political consequences. 
Naturally we do not claim that all the proposals made here are new. We do not 
aspire to novelty per se, but to usefulness. Myriads of new policies and strategies 
are invented in response to global problems each year. Our aim is not to add 
to their number. Rather, the epochal challenge we face today – in this world of 
missing cooperation under growing interdependence – is to identify a coherent 








The proposals summarized in this document are meant to provide insights for 
action to promote global cooperation in addressing major global problems. 
These insights have received sizable agreement from the GES panelists, 
participants and the wider GES community, but they do not reﬂ  ect the views of 
any particular panelist, participant or community member. Nor do they reﬂ  ect 
the views of any organization to which these individuals belong. 
Global Economic 
Solutions
Needless to say, this is a tall order. Success can only be achieved through the 
cumulation of many small steps in a coherent direction. The GES is meant to 
contribute to this process. The insights presented here are the product of a 
prolonged exchange of ideas – during the GES and in the months before and 
after it – among leaders from the business, policy-making, academic and civic 
communities. Although the GES participants come from diverse walks of life, 
they share the belief that we need a reawakening of global cooperation in our 
current multi-polar world.
All past instances of global cooperation began as ideas in the heads of 
individuals that grew into visions that aligned people´s diverse efforts. The GES 
seeks to help generate such ideas. While none of us can make a substantial 
difference in isolation, each of us can make limited, concrete changes towards 
the common good, and the sum of all these changes will be our legacy for the 
next generation.
We hope that this document will stimulate further research, debate and policy 
initiatives. If the GES is to have real value, it must be merely the beginning of a 
continuing process – a process of creating a shared framework of thought that 
can inspire diverse decision-makers to pull in the same direction. Content
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Reform current educatinal systems to enable people to take a higher level 
of personal responsibility for their own and their children´s education 
and development and to pursue lifelong learning.
This will involve providing more temporarily ﬂ   exible education modules, 
spreading educational expenditures across people´s working lifetimes and 
raising on spending lifelong learning at least in line with the extra tax revenues 
such learning is expected to generate. As the new wave of globalization will 
imply more change in shorter intervals, individuals need to be open to new 
developments. Individuals will have to take a higher level of personal responsibility 
for their lives. They have to be ﬂ  exible, accept change and be able to cope 
with change. Given the increasing speed and unpredictability of changes in the 
composition of jobs available and the job speciﬁ  c skills required, learning how 
to learn will be more important than learning any particular set of skills. People 
need to embrace continuous learning as a positive that makes their lives more 
interesting and stimulating.
Supporting and nurturing the required skills cannot be restricted to schools and 
universities, but should extend from early childhood up to old age, from families 
to kindergarten to school and university to business, government entities and 
society at large. Too many people assume that the skills and knowledge they 
acquired at school and university or during vocational training should remain 
adequate for their whole working life. Globalization and technological change 
that render some of that knowledge obsolete are therefore accompanied 
with excessive anxieties, feelings of powerlessness and calls for government 
intervention.
1. Skills for the 
  New Wave of 
 Globalization
Challenge
The new wave of globalization – in which outsourcing and offshoring include 
not only unskilled and manufacturing jobs, but also skilled and service sector 
jobs – makes new demands on education and training systems around the 
world. Globalization is no longer just about trade in things that can be put in a 
box, but also about trade in everything that can be digitalized.
This process radically widens the circle of workers directly affected by 
international competition. To enable individuals, ﬁ  rms and societies to cope 
with the challenges from the new wave of globalization, education and skills 
will be key. 
What skills do workers need to beneﬁ  t from the new wave of  globalization?
What policies are required to develop the skill base that allows 
individuals, ﬁ  rms and societies to be successful in a highly competitive global 
economy? How do education systems need to be changed to best prepare 










More group activities and interactions may also be essential components of the 
new curriculum, including, where appropriate, grading the group´s performance 
rather than the individual´s. Both schools and universities need to emphasize a 
more participatory learning process that features learning by doing. Learning 
to learn and learning to formalize and solve novel problems is generally more 
important than acquiring any speciﬁ  c knowledge.
In many countries, despite recent reforms, many of the skills that will 
be increasingly important in the future are not systematically taught in 
schools that still focus too much on things that were important to serve 
the needs of the factory age (such as following instructions and doing 
well-deﬁ   ned assigned work, much of which is highly standardized). 
All too often schools still focus too much on developing traditional cognitive 
skills, on teaching narrow facts and solving routine problems with rules-based 
solution.
GESolution 2
Focus education systems more heavily on developing students´ 
imaginations, social competence and communication skills.
Creativity, inventiveness, spontaneity, social competence and communications 
skills will become ever more important for individuals to attain a competitive 
edge in the globalized service economy.
Elementary and secondary schools need to place more emphasis on developing 
these skills. They need to develop children´s imaginations and people skills as 
well as basic literacy and numeracy. Schools need to nurture children´s ability to 
solve novel, non-routine problems, to combine different bodies of knowledge 
and to interact productively with other people.
This will require changes in school curricula and in the ways of testing and 
grading students. Instead of rote drills on questions with simple right/wrong 
answers, teachers should pose more open-ended questions and novel and 
even ill-deﬁ  ned problems that have no simple answers – questions that can be 
wrestled with productively.
1. Skills for the 












Diversify the content of secondary and tertiary education to permit a 
multiple-track approach to jobs, promoting skill diversity. 
 
As talent and intellectual ability are multi-dimensional, a one-size-ﬁ  ts-all 
educational approach is not going to mobilize the full potential of many. 
Education systems should promote individuals´ diverse special abilities and 
provide multiple tracks towards creative jobs of all varieties. At the same time, 
the content of secondary and tertiary education must become more ﬂ  exible to 
adapt to the changing needs of the labor market. 
The current standard role model of learning does not ﬁ  t either people´s diversity 
of talents and attitude nor the demands of future employers.
GESolution 3
Raise the status of vocational education. Adapt vocational education and 
training programs to promote workers´ ﬂ  exibility and versatility (rather 
than just the narrow vocational/technical qualiﬁ  cations),  creativity, 
social competence and communication skills.
 
There seems to be little or no correlation between educational requirements 
and how “offshorable” jobs are. Many trained workers and craftsmen are 
performing tasks that are and will probably remain (for quite some time) secure 
from offshoring. These workers may face better employment prospects than 
some of the university graduates that produce impersonal services that can be 
delivered electronically.
An unconditional advertising of college and university education over vocational 
education is therefore inappropriate. The widespread view that vocational 
training occupations are generally a step down from those that require a 
university degree is inappropriate and needs to change. More vocational 
education may actually be necessary – not less. 
But, as for schools and universities, vocational training programs have to adapt 
to the changes associated with the new phase of globalization. They will have to 
emphasize and foster workers´ ﬂ  exibility and versatility across tasks rather than 
just the traditional vocational/technical qualiﬁ  cations. And they need to focus 
more on developing workers´ creativity, social competence and communication 
skills that are required by many of the non-routine, personal delivery tasks that 
are (more) secure from offshoring. 
1. Skills for the 











Thus, successful families and a healthy social environment are major determinants 
of successful schools. Greater emphasis needs to be directed towards family 
and social policies. Education policies need to be complemented by policies 
to support disadvantaged families, integrate immigrants, improve urban 
neighborhoods and reduce rural poverty. 
Traditionally skill formation and education policies focus too much on schools 
and in particular on secondary and tertiary education. They generally pay 
too little attention to early childhood education and to the importance that 
family and social environments have for the development of cognitive and 
non-cognitive skills. 
1. Skills for the 
  New Wave of 
 Globalization
GESolution 5
Complement family and social policies with early childhood education, 
to emphasize social competence, communication skills and motivation 
to learn.
 
Early childhood education is crucial in creating the abilities and motivations 
that affect learning throughout an individual´s life. Any reform of the education 
system therefore has to pay particular attention to pre-school and elementary 
school education. 
Family policy and social policy are of major importance in the context of early 
childhood learning. Social competence, communication skills and motivation to 
learn are developed at a young age in the home and the residential neighborhood 
as much as in school. Often, cognitive and non-cognitive deﬁ  cits emerge early, 










The new wave of globalization will have important implications for future skill 
requirements, and countries will have to reform their educational institutions 
in ways that help young people live up to the future challenges. Important 
features of the new wave of globalization are suddenness and unpredictability 
of change, including change in work proﬁ  les and the speciﬁ  c skills required.
Since it is hard to predict, what jobs will be available in the future, learning 
how to learn may be more important than learning any particular set of skills. 
Assuming that those tasks most at risk of being offshored are those that are 
routine or prone to routinization and that do not require personal presence, 
creativity and imagination, social competence and communication skills will 
become ever more important.
Many of the skills that will be particularly important in the future are not 
systematically taught in schools, which still have many features designed to 
serve the needs of the factory age. Reforming schools and universities will 
therefore be a key policy response to the new wave of globalization.
Nurturing the required skills cannot be restricted to schools and universities. 
Families, schools and ﬁ   rms, are all important in promoting skill formation. 
Skill acquisition is a dynamic process in which early inputs strongly affect the 
productivity of later inputs. Early childhood is therefore of great importance in 
creating the abilities and motivation that affect learning and skill acquisition 
throughout the life cycle. Successful families are a major determinant of 
successful schools.
1. Skills for the 
  New Wave of 
 Globalization
Background
Globalization has entered a new phase in which an increasing number of jobs 
previously sheltered from international competition are threatened by potential 
outsourcing and offshoring. These are mainly jobs producing impersonally 
delivered services. These changes are signiﬁ   cant since the new wave of 
globalization radically widens the circle of workers affected by international 
competition given that services constitute the major part of employment in 
developed countries.
In addition, due mainly to progress in information and communication 
technologies, the dividing line between services that have to be personally 
delivered and those that do not is constantly changing in a way that exposes 
ever more jobs to international competition.
In the new wave of globalization, the forces of globalization will achieve a far 
ﬁ  ner resolution. International competition will increasingly play itself at the level 
of tasks and individuals within ﬁ  rms – not just at the level of ﬁ  rms, sectors or 
skill groups. Since individual tasks in ofﬁ  ces and factories can be offshored, 
globalization may help some workers in a given ﬁ  rm while harming others.
Similarly, the old correlation between skill groups and winners and losers 
from globalization breaks down. Certain highly skilled tasks may turn out to 
be “offshorable”, while other highly skilled tasks will not. Increased offshoring 
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Redesign welfare systems so as to strengthen individual incentives for 
job search and for work, such as through hiring and wage subsidies, 
as well as payroll tax reductions, instead of generous and prolonged 
unemployment beneﬁ   ts. Remove institutional barriers to supplying 
labor, especially in the tax and social security system.
Economic research has shown that, across developed countries, unemployment 
rates are highly correlated with measures of the generosity of the welfare 
system. There seems to be a close connection to the level of unemployment 
beneﬁ  ts and the duration of entitlements.
In addition, the restrictiveness of the unemployment beneﬁ  t system seems to 
play an important role. Given the empirical evidence, reforms of the welfare 
system that strengthen the individual incentives for job search and for work in 
general should be high on the political agenda in many countries. 
Average working hours vary substantially across countries. In some cases, low 
hours may reﬂ  ect deliberate choices, but evidence shows that the incentives 
arising from high marginal effective tax rates as well as the social insurance 




Many people in the developed world are not participating in the growth of 
the world economy. In some countries, unemployment remains high, whereas 
others suffer from the problems of the working poor. What are the most 
effective policies for creating employment – particularly in well-paid, satisfying 
jobs – in OECD countries? 
How does the choice of these policies depend on what other policies are in 
place elsewhere in the welfare system? What role can business play in creating 
employment? What interplay between public policy and private enterprise 











Use demand management policies to boost employment in countries 
with high unemployment and where labor supply is sufﬁ  ciently ﬂ  exible 
to respond to variations in product demand.    
Without an increase in the demand for labor, an increase in labor supply 
might simply raise unemployment. For example, higher labor supply may not 
automatically contribute to lower real product wages and hence boost the 
demand for labor. Moreover, if ﬁ  rms hire workers who previously lived on various 
beneﬁ  t systems, the income of these workers will only increase marginally, 
since the after-tax replacement rates in the beneﬁ  t systems are often around 
60–80%. 
Hence, product demand may not increase enough (as a result of new hiring) 
to contribute to a sufﬁ  cient sustained increase in derived demand for labor. Of 
course, employment subsidies may help boost aggregate labor demand for a 
while.
But Keynesian demand management may be useful in reducing unemployment. 
Policies such as tax reductions, public sector investment and public sector 
consumption – as a complement to supply-side policies – might be considered. 
Monetary and ﬁ  scal policies should keep employment at its maximum sustainable 
level – the level possible without generating rising inﬂ  ation. In this regard, 
features of unemployment beneﬁ  t systems and active labor market policies help 
to determine to what extent an added labor supply is “effective.”
GESolution 2
Use retraining subsidies for the long-term unemployed and low-skilled 
workers to strengthen the market power of labor market “outsiders.”
We should strengthen the market power of labor market “outsiders,” that is, 
unemployed workers, individuals living on different types of social beneﬁ  ts and 
new entrants to the labor market (including immigrants). Obvious examples 
of such policies are so-called active labor market policies, including retraining 
and employment subsidies for long-term unemployed and individuals with little 
appropriate skills.
In countries, such as the U.S. and the U.K., where the wage dispersion is huge 
and the number of working poor is large, it is natural to give the subsidies 
in the form of income transfers directly to low-wage workers (to encourage 
them to work). By contrast, in countries with more compressed wage dispersion 
(perhaps as a result of high minimum wages), it makes more sense to subsidize 













Consider unemployment accounts as a possible option to provide 
incentives for unemployed workers.
Under this system, workers make monthly contributions to their individual 
accounts and make speciﬁ  ed withdrawals when they are unemployed. While 
governments´ redistributional objectives could be met by taxing and subsidizing 
account contributions, unemployed workers would gain greater incentives 
to work, provided that account balances on retirement can be transferred to 
pension or health accounts.
GESolution 4
Promote deregulation and encourage entrepreneurship and investment 
to boost employment.
In addition to short-term demand management, long-term structural reforms 
may also help to boost employment. Deregulation, designed to encourage 
entrepreneurship, innovation and investment, especially in the service sector, 
may therefore have long-term positive effects on employment creation. Policies 
to strengthen investment and competition help to ensure that labor demand 
responds more strongly to increases in supply. 
To reduce unemployment and keep it low, it is important that policies do not 
impede and indeed sometimes assist, dynamic adjustment in the labor market 
in response to general developments in an economy. This calls for adequate 
wage ﬂ  exibility and mobility of labor – which are affected by factors such as 
unemployment beneﬁ  ts and housing policies – but also training opportunities 
and job search assistance.
Investment in public infrastructure, such as the development of high-speed 
telecommunications ﬁ  ber networks, has a role to play in creating employment 













Pursue policies to provide work and work incentives for disabled 
people.
Disability rates have been increasing in many OECD countries over past decades, 
despite general improvements in health status. They now exceed unemployment 
rates in some countries.
Lax entry conditions to disability schemes, limited subsequent control, weak 
efforts at rehabilitation and insufﬁ  cient opportunities for people with reduced 
work capacity to seek and get a job are among the barriers to labor supply in 
this area.
GESolution 6
In various OECD countries, stimulate employment of older workers by 
reducing incentives for early retirement.
With respect to labor supply in general, actuarially unfair public pension systems, 
early retirement schemes and lenient rules for older recipients of unemployment 
beneﬁ  ts all skew people´s incentives in the direction of ceasing to work at an 
early age.
Across OECD countries, the employment of older workers is strongly related 
to the strength of such incentives. With rising longevity, further reform in this 
area is not just a question of removing barriers to employment but also about 













Flexible labor markets seem to be superior in creating employment and income 
opportunities for the poor, in contrast to labor protection schemes such as 
minimum wages. In many countries, the welfare system seems to be an obstacle 
to employment of the less qualiﬁ   ed. Reforms should address the problem 
of guaranteeing a minimum income for the less qualiﬁ  ed while maintaining 
incentives to work.
Demand for workers with relatively low skills may be penalized by overly high 
labor costs. Barriers in this area include wage ﬂ  oors – either statutory minimum 
wages or de facto minima driven by public transfers. But wages sufﬁ  ciently low 
to clear the market may not be socially acceptable and ways to alleviate the 
trade-off between social and employment objectives include in-work beneﬁ  ts 
and labor subsidies. But these are not without problems. 
To reduce youth unemployment, vocational training systems have in some 
countries proven to be successful. Government training schemes, in contrast, 
have often proven expensive and not effective. Some types of supply-side policy 
have not been successful. Training programs for low-skilled adult individuals 
have seldom contributed to many jobs. 
Moreover, employment subsidies, while often helping speciﬁ  c individuals to be
hired, tend to crowd out employed workers from non-subsidized work. Harsher 
supply-side policies in the labor market may also be required.
An obvious example is a softening of job security legislation for market “insiders,” 
that is, workers with well-protected jobs in the formal sector of the economy. 
GESolution 8
Stimulate the participation of women in the labor forces of various OECD 
countries, particularly through reform of the tax system and childcare 
provision.
With improved education, women´s participation in labor markets is approaching 
that of men in many countries. But there are still barriers to female participation 
arising from tax systems or related to childcare.
GESolution 9
In various OECD countries, promote the employment of minority groups 
through education reforms designed to promote social integration.
Speciﬁ  c groups, including ethnic minorities and second-generation immigrants, 
have low participation rates in many countries. Educational failure and associated 
low earnings capacity, discrimination and insufﬁ   cient work focus in public 
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Other examples are a removal of laws that automatically extend collective wage 
agreements to ﬁ  rms without organized workers, and a softening of minimum 
wage legislation, in particular for young and inexperienced workers. Clearly, 
such policies have social and distributional disadvantages for those who already 
have jobs. The political difﬁ  culties are therefore obvious.
Qualiﬁ  cations
There are differences of opinion as to the appropriate mix of supply- and demand-
side policies. In particular, there are differences in emphasis on measures to 
increase the incentives to work by increasing demand (by ﬁ  scal and/or monetary 
policy).
One panelist argues that there is evidence of a trade-off between inﬂ  ation 
and unemployment at low rates of inﬂ  ation: in such circumstances, while high 
inﬂ  ation should deﬁ  nitely be avoided, central banks pursuing very low inﬂ  ation 
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Use foreign aid to support poor countries in developing virtual 
education.
Virtual distance education programs can help poor countries not only to reduce 
to constraints on access to knowledge but also to ﬁ   ght potential gaps in 
institutional infrastructure. For example, a big challenge is training teachers in 
developing countries: about 35 million need to upgrade their skills. This cannot 
be achieved only by traditional classroom based programs. Therefore, this 
proposal is to invest in e-learning methods for teachers. 
Educational provision in poor countries often suffers from infrastructure 
problems, such as transport and location, and differences in the quality of 
teachers.
3. Enabling Poor 
  Countries to    
 Share  Knowledge
Challenge
Poor countries are typically rich in people but poor in human capital. To beneﬁ  t 
from an increasingly global division of labor and to stand their ground in a 
competitive economic environment, they have to make their people more 
knowledgeable. In this, they face considerable challenges: they may lack a 
workable institutional infrastructure for education and information; they may 
lack political and social leadership that foresees the beneﬁ  t of investment in 
technology and skills; and their access to advanced knowledge may be restricted 
by strict enforcement of intellectual property rights.
Public policy in poor countries should focus on raising literacy. This approach 
should be supported by foreign aid and an international strategic partnership 
to bridge the digital divide between and within countries and to establish open 











Commit multinational investors and business leaders to facilitate the 
transfer of knowledge in poor countries. Evaluate the effectiveness of 
such transfer through an independent agency. 
Key to the technological development of a country is enlightened leadership at 
the very top of the government, which is willing to invest in technology. It is not 
easy to get suitably enlightened leaders but showing examples of others and 
benchmarking with other leading countries can help. Multinational investors 
are mostly global leaders in innovation; their activities in developing countries 
can be transformative. Business leaders must recognize that their corporate 
governance affects the governance of their host country.
A great hindrance for individuals, ﬁ   rms and governments are failures in 
government attitudes towards economic freedom and civil and individual 
liberty.
GESolution 2
Encourage free, independent and pluralistic media in poor countries.
The media can play a crucial role in education. The development of local, free 
and independent media can empower people to get access to knowledge to 
improve their lives and alleviate poverty. National governments should promote 
the development of new digital offerings and create small multimedia centers.
In addition to traditional radio and television programming, big global 
broadcasters like Deutsche Welle, the BBC and Radio France Internationale 
provide educational products and courses focused on the needs of developing 
countries.
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The role of the World Health Organization has to be expanded as a location 
for globally provided assistance funds to encourage the development of new 
drugs for diseases of poor countries. It could be a clearinghouse for best 
practices information on advance market commitments and the management 
of intellectual property rights in public-private drug and vaccine development 
initiatives.
The present approach of strengthening intellectual property rights within 
the WTO needs further consideration. While the requirements that countries 
adopt more transparent intellectual property rights has promise for improving 
international technology transfer, rigorous standards of protection for patents, 
copyrights and plant varieties could diminish the access of poor countries to 
new knowledge. Further tightening of these standards should be avoided with 
respect to developing countries.
GESolution 4
Use “advance market commitments” to stimulate and reward innovators, 
not just in the funding of vaccines and other medicines for developing 
countries, but also for key technologies to integrate poor countries 
into the knowledge economy. Expand the World Health Organization 
to become a clearinghouse for best practices in advance market 
commitments and the management of intellectual property rights for 
medicines. 
A promising approach comprises “advance market commitments”, whereby 
donors commit money to guarantee the price of vaccines or other medicines 
once they have been successfully developed, thus creating the potential for a 
viable future market. In principle, such a system could be extended beyond the 
area of vaccines and even beyond the health care system to any key technology 
that seems essential for integrating poor countries into the knowledge economy. 
The ﬁ  nancial funds for rewarding the innovators could be raised by national 
foreign aid as well as by international institutions such as the UNCTAD or even 
by private charities.
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Successfully tapping the pool of global knowledge requires the ability of the 
domestic economy to make use of superior knowledge, which in turn requires 
a sufﬁ  ciently educated domestic labor force. Tertiary education has largely been 
overlooked by the international community as an important component of a 
country´s development strategy.
Even if knowledge and technical information are widely available on global 
markets or within public sources, they are useful only to the extent they can 
be absorbed and implemented into local production and provision of public 
services. And since much of that information may be available electronically, a 
focus on both education and computer skills seems appropriate for developing 
countries.
Time and money should be invested in evaluating what works in the ﬁ  eld of aid 
in education. E-learning has many potential beneﬁ  ts for the developing world 
as well as for secondary and tertiary education and lifelong learning.
Another aspect of lifelong learning and the access to information and knowledge 
is covered by international and national media. UNESCO has launched initiatives 
to provide the general public with affordable access to information and a variety 
of government services, using information and communication technologies.
The institutional environment plays a central role in the ability of countries to 
ﬁ  nd ways out of the “knowledge poverty” trap. All countries need to implement 
GESolution 5
Preserve and catalog indigenous knowledge to encourage poor 
countries to develop and beneﬁ  t from their local knowledge. Negotiate 
a multilateral treaty at the World Trade Organization on access to basic 
science and technology in areas of global public goods, such as health, 
education, environment and food technologies. 
Knowledge of today is not the only knowledge that matters. Indigenous 
knowledge is crucial to the lives of local communities, a core element in their food 
security, health, education and natural resources management. Consequently, it 
is important to preserve and catalogue this kind of knowledge to enable poor 
countries to help themselves and ﬁ  nd local solutions. Many people in poor 
countries have lost access to the indigenous knowledge of their community.
We should work towards establishing national pools with indigenous knowledge 
and international pools of knowledge in key areas of global public goods (health, 
education, environment, food technologies) to which widespread access would 
be provided.
Governments are increasingly imposing restraints on the use of knowledge 
generated by public research or through public funding. Such restrictions arise 
in part from regulations designed to protect national competitiveness and in part 
from product regulations that emerge from the increasing scope of intellectual 
property protection for basic scientiﬁ  c results in the EU and the U.S., which 
remain the primary generators of knowledge.
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policies that encourage innovation, access and the development of advanced 
skills to nurture creativity in a highly competitive, innovation-driven environment. 
For developing countries, it means reforms that emphasize openness to 
new ideas, new products and new investment, especially in information and 
communication technologies. 
In the global context, patent protection is a very important issue. The current 
system is not sufﬁ  cient to give poor countries access to knowledge, particularly 
in the areas of public health, food security and environmental protection. 
Improved integration of poor countries into the global knowledge economy 
calls for a facilitated access to patented technical knowledge. 
Under a system of advanced market commitments, donors commit money to 
guarantee the price of vaccines once they have been developed, thus creating 
the potential for a viable future market. Decisions about which diseases to 
target, criteria for effectiveness, price and long-term availability are made in 
advance by an independent advisory group.
The donor commitments provide vaccine makers with the incentives they need 
to invest the considerable sums required to conduct research, train staff and 
build manufacturing facilities. At the same time, vaccine makers no longer 
have exclusive intellectual property rights that would entitle them to prosecute 
imitators.
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Enhance transparency by standardization of complex ﬁ  nancial contracts 
and shifting the trading of derivatives onto regulated exchanges.
Consensus to improve transparency and accountability has routinely been 
reached after every ﬁ  nancial crisis. But since the ﬁ  nancial system is evolving 
continuously, the battle is never over. As the system generates new complexity 
and obscurity over time, regulation and supervision need to evolve accordingly. 
Yet transparency is required to help restore market conﬁ  dence, notably in the 
market for derivatives such as credit default swaps. 
Standardized contracts would reduce complexity and uncertainty. The develop-
ment of exchange-based trading (as opposed to over-the-counter trading) 
should be encouraged since this is conducive to standardization, more liquid 
markets and greater ease of pricing avoiding large counterparty or trading 
positions on the balance sheets of banks. 
Regulators should devise new methods to improve the quality of disclosure. 
For example, the Senior Supervisors Group has proposed a template for this 
purpose, but there has been little momentum to follow through on this initiative 
for large numbers of systemically relevant ﬁ  nancial institutions. 
Challenge
The repeated occurrence of ﬁ  nancial crises since the early 1990s has led to 
calls for institutional reform. The increasingly blurred boundaries between 
banking, securities and insurance, as well as the formation of large ﬁ  nancial 
conglomerates operating on a worldwide scale, contrast with regulation and 
supervision that is still national, fragmented even within countries and lagging 
behind market developments.
Financial globalization helps individual market participants to diversify risk 
but need not stabilize the international ﬁ  nancial system as a whole. Given 
highly complex ﬁ  nancial innovations and interconnected markets, a shock in 
one particular market segment is bound to trigger serious contagion in other 
segments. The recent U.S. housing market decline led to contagion in a broad 
range of ﬁ  nancial markets, which has infected the real economy worldwide.
How can we reduce the probability of future ﬁ  nancial crises and limit their
potential costs? What policies are required to minimize systemic risk? Which 
kind of regulatory and supervisory approaches are appropriate? How does 
ﬁ  nancial regulation relate to monetary policy, both during the run-up to crises 
and after the bursting of ﬁ  nancial bubbles?
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Make bailouts come at a cost; tougher supervision and tighter capital 
standards are the price ﬁ  nancial institutions have to pay for ofﬁ  cial 
rescue operations meant to stem systemic risk.
Central banks should be cautious in bailing out ﬁ  nancial institutions. Considering 
that highly leveraged institutions have increasingly been rescued recently (for 
reasons of being “too big to fail”), the still relatively narrow regulatory domain 
needs to be aligned with the expanded domain of liquidity support by central 
banks. Clearly, the principle to be applied in normal times for isolated failures 
has to be distinguished from crisis management measures.
Governments often impose only soft constraints as a quid pro quo for capital 
injections. Thus, the shareholders often retain their capital and the managers 
remain in place, even as they receive taxpayers´ capital.
Shareholders should lose part of their capital and the management be replaced, 
to reduce moral hazard. But this measure alone is insufﬁ  cient, since it leaves 
the ﬁ  nancial system undercapitalized. Furthermore, it appears that stockholders 
often exert little discipline on ﬁ  nancial institutions, even when workers own a 
large share of them. Thus, government capital injections should be accompanied 
by burden sharing with debt holders and other counterparties. 
GESolution 2
Strengthen regulation and supervision of all systemically relevant   
ﬁ   nancial institutions – both in the banking and shadow-banking 
sectors – but avoid regulatory overkill by focusing on simple rules on 
capital adequacy.
Financial institutions above a certain threshold size should be required to meet 
“basic disclosure requirements.” Capital requirements for risky and complex 
exposures have to be reviewed and probably raised. This should pertain to the 
systemically relevant ﬁ  nancial institutions not just to the banking sector, but also in 
the “shadow banking” sector (which includes money market funds, hedge funds 
and ﬁ  nancial insurers) across all the relevant countries. International cooperation 
should help enforce best practice and prevent regulatory arbitrage.
But regulatory overkill should be avoided to prevent ﬁ  nancial innovation being 
stiﬂ  ed altogether. This calls for relatively simple rules and regulations such as clear 
minimum capital-asset ratios combined with higher risk capital requirements for 
proprietary trading positions and for hedge funds, recognizing the operational 
risk they are running. 
As supervisory authorities do not currently have responsibility for promoting the 
stability of the ﬁ  nancial system as a whole, macro-prudential supervision should 
be explored further, with a view to enabling supervisory authorities to join ﬁ  scal 
authorities and central banks in providing safeguards against ﬁ  nancial distress. 
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Eliminate conﬂ  icts of interest and promote competition in the credit 
rating market.
Financial market regulation should not rely on the ratings of credit rating 
agencies. In particular, central banks should no longer base their collateral rules 
on the assessment of ﬁ  xed-income products by these agencies. 
Should rating agencies continue to be given a role in ﬁ  nancial market regulation, 
then conﬂ   icts of interest must be reduced by preventing any agency from 
participating as a structuring consultant and a rater in the same transaction. 
Furthermore, the special status of the three rating agencies should be mitigated 
by introducing more competition into the credit rating market.
GESolution 4
Address the procyclicality of the ﬁ  nancial and regulatory system by 
adjusting mark-to-market accounting and by introducing ﬂ  exible capital 
adequacy requirements.
While current mark-to-market accounting clearly exacerbates the cycle, simply 
suspending it when crisis looms is not the solution. But limiting mark-to-market 
accounting to assets and liabilities with a short term of, say, less than a year, 
may provide a reasonable option.
Minimum capital-asset ratios should be raised during boom periods and relaxed 
in a slump. Speciﬁ  cally, to moderate excessive bank lending during a boom and 
encourage the build-up of reserves, regulatory capital adequacy requirements 
might be raised to the extent that the growth in bank asset values exceeds a 
predetermined level. This approach has numerous practical complications, but 
then so does the central bankers´ task of setting interest rates today to control 
inﬂ  ation in 18 months time.
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Reforming the regulatory framework is essentially about creating sensible 
economic incentives for market participants. Accordingly, the need now is not 
for more or less regulation and supervision, but for smarter regulation and 
supervision.
The problem of procyclicality may be as old as ﬁ  nancial markets themselves – 
but recent accounting and regulation has aggravated the problem. Current 
mark-to-market practices constitute a massive pro-cyclical ampliﬁ  er:  credit 
booms raise valuations, which in turn raise the banks´ ability to lend; the 
opposite mechanism takes hold in a downturn, as we are currently experiencing. 
The logic of current mark-to-market accounting is dubious, especially for assets 
that are funded long term. Arguably, institutions with a long-term investment 
horizon such as pension funds and insurance companies have been “drawn” 
into ﬁ  nancial volatility through mark-to-market accounting.
By contrast, the combination of high leverage and short-term funding is 
particularly risky – as the fate of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers have 
attested. Excessive leverage may be easy to spot at hedge funds and investment 
banks, but leverage ultimately originates from commercial bank behavior. This 
implies that better bank regulation matters as much as extending regulation 
to so far unregulated institutions. Risk tends to return to the banking industry 
under conditions of stress. Hence, the incentives to transfer risks to off-balance 
sheet conduits – to reduce regulatory capital charges – need to be addressed 
during normal times.
GESolution 6
Replace the Basel II accord, in order to ensure systemic stability by 
factoring both illiquidity and insolvency risks into capital adequacy 
requirements and to deprive credit rating agencies of their regulatory 
inﬂ  uence. 
Redesigning capital adequacy requirements in another reform of the Basel Accord 
would be insufﬁ  cient to contain systemic risk: microeconomic best practice does 
not ensure systemic stability. At the same time, the classical distinction between 
insolvency (of highly leveraged institutions) and (global) illiquidity is increasingly 
blurred, considering that fragile balance sheets of large ﬁ  nancial institutions 
involve systemic risk due to disorderly unwinding of exposures.
GESolution 7
Gear monetary policy towards price stability ﬁ  rst and foremost but, to 
avoid asset price bubbles, leave open the possibility of “leaning against 
the wind.”
Relying on interest rates to prick asset price bubbles would be a mistake: for the 
rest of the economy, the cure would be worse than the disease. Monetary policy 
may curb excessive credit growth and thereby prevent inﬂ  ating unsustainable 
booms.
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Countercyclical accounting procedures and regulations will not stop booms and 
busts, but they may mitigate them. Raising capital requirements during periods 
of easy credit would contain exuberance, while relaxing them in a slump would 
protect against the inevitable downturn. 
Some central banks are blamed for having inﬂ  ated an unsustainable boom. 
Considering assignment problems, however, it would be too much to ask central 
banks to deliver both price and ﬁ  nancial stability. It is one thing to criticize 
monetary accommodation in the past, and another one to assign a systematic 
dual role to central banks. 
Basel II is an improvement over Basel I in that it asks banks to take a more 
complete view of their capital requirements. But systemic liquidity risk would 
remain even if Basel II promotes microeconomic best practice. It also appears 
unwise to rely on the banks assessing their own vulnerability. Not only may their 
assessment be skewed, but this also fails to take a system-wide view. 
The reliance on credit rating agencies has led, particularly with highly structured 
paper, to negligence and failure of due diligence with professional market 
participants such as traders, asset managers, loan ofﬁ  cers, pension managers 
and monoline insurers. The greater role assigned to the agencies has only 
impaired the banks´ incentives to assess credit risk carefully. But rating agencies 
do not appear to have either the capability or the incentives to substitute banks´ 
central role in credit evaluation.
4. Strengthening 
 the  Global 










Some suggestions to overcome 
the ﬁ  nancial crisis
*
by Willem Buiter, Professor of European Political Economy, European Institute, London 
School of Economics and Political Science
G20 leaders should better coordinate their crisis “ﬁ  reﬁ  ghting” efforts, including 
recapitalizations, lending guarantees, ﬁ  scal expansions and toxic-asset valuations. 
They should also set in motion institutional reforms:
￿  Establishing a new G7/8 (the U.S., the EU, Japan, China, India, Brazil, Saudi 
  Arabia and possibly Russia or South Africa) with the IMF as its secretariat.
￿  Boosting IMF lending capacity.
￿  Creating a uniform global regulatory framework for rating agencies and for 
  large, highly-leveraged institutions with signiﬁ  cant cross-border activities.
The leaders of the G20 nations should consider two quite separate classes of 
decisions: putting out the ﬁ  res; and adjusting global institutions.
*This piece ﬁ  rst appeared as “Some suggestions for the G20 on Nov. 15th”  in “The essays: What 
G20 leaders must do to stabilise our economy and ﬁ  x the ﬁ  nancial system,” edited by Barry 
Eichengreen and Richard Baldwin, a VoxEU.org publication, 2008. http://VoxEU.org
Appendix
The GES 2008 took place just before the global ﬁ  nancial crisis became 
truly acute. So we have supplemented the recommendations made at 
the GES by further proposals from the GES community that have been 
made subsequently.
These proposals include the following: 
￿  Create a global regulator to identify systemically relevant ﬁ  nancial 
  institutions and harmonize capital adequacy ratios for them. 
￿  Give systemically relevant ﬁ  nancial institutions a solvency guarantee, ﬁ  nanced 
  by taxes and debt-for-equity swaps. 
￿ Alternatively, return to a system of narrow banking by forcing ﬁ  nancial 
  institutions to choose between the status of a commercial bank and that 
  of investment bank. Investment banks must ensure that the duration of their 
  liabilities is on average at least as long as the duration of their assets. 
￿ Increase transparency in the credit markets by introducing a global 
 credit  register.
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Denmark, Sweden, Australia and New Zealand are vulnerable, but so are 
Belgium, Ireland, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, even though they 
are members of the euro area. The U.K. does have a large, internationally 
exposed banking sector. The risk of a banking crisis whose resolution would 
require a foreign currency lender of last resort is real. Because sterling is not a 
serious global reserve currency, a combined banking crisis and sterling crisis is 
a threat. Other European countries with banking sectors that are not terribly 
large, could nevertheless ﬁ  nd themselves at risk because their governments 
are already in bad ﬁ  scal shape. Greece and Italy come to mind. I hope that 
behind-the-curtain contingency planning is going on in ﬁ  nance ministries 
with deep pockets.
5. Avoiding a moral hazard race to the bottom. Unless there are binding 
international agreements on the kind of guarantees extended by 
governments to ﬁ   nancial institutions and creditors in their jurisdictions, 
we will see a replay of the moral hazard explosion that followed the 
Irish decision to guarantee all liabilities of the six largest majority 
Irish-owned banks. The result could be every creditor fully guaranteed and 
taxpayers taken to the cleaners. Not only would this be outrageously unfair, 
it would create terrible incentives for future reckless lending. The IMF should 
monitor and police any norms adopted.
6. Agree common access rules and common methods for valuing illiquid assets 
in different national TARP-like structures TARP-like toxic asset dumps are 
essential for understanding the true balance sheets of banks and other 
Fireﬁ  ghting measures
Actions to be considered include:
1.  Treasury guarantees for cross-border interbank lending, or, equivalently, 
central banks acting as universal counterparty of last resort in unsecured 
interbank transactions, including cross-border unsecured interbank lending 
and borrowing.
2. Mandatory recapitalization of banks to a uniform international standard 
well in excess of the Basel II ratios. Governments should tell banks in their 
jurisdictions to raise their tier one capital ratios to, say, 11% by a certain date. 
If the shortfall cannot be made up by the deadline from private sources, the 
state will inject the balance, either in the form of ordinary equity or through 
convertible preference shares. 
3. A coordinated global ﬁ  scal expansion, modulated by “ability to borrow”. 
Countries with stronger government budget, current account and external 
asset positions should engineer a stronger ﬁ  scal stimulus.
4. Fiscal bailouts of advanced industrial countries whose systemically important 
banks have a solvency gap that exceeds the government´s ﬁ  scal capacity. 
The problem of systemically important banks or other ﬁ  nancial institutions 
whose need for external resources beyond what can be ﬁ  nanced privately 
exceeds the ﬁ  scal capacity of its government, is not only conﬁ  ned to small 
countries with large banking sectors and their own currencies. Switzerland, 
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3. Change IMF quotas and voting rights in line with shares of world GDP at PPP 
exchange rates, subject to the constraint that no country has veto power 
(18% of the total votes or more).
4. Turn the IMF into the permanent secretariat for the new G7/8.
5. Agree to adhere rigorously to mark-to-market accounting and reporting 
principles and agree on common rules for relaxing regulatory requirements 
attached to mark-to-market valuations. 
It has taken decades to agree on mark-to-market (or “fair value”) accounting 
and reporting. It would be the height of insanity to throw that achievement 
out of the window because regulators cannot apply common sense in their 
application of capital ratios, liquidity ratios and other regulatory requirements 
that are inﬂ  uenced by marked-to-market asset valuations. The regulatory 
consequences of valuation distortions can be adjusted, in a uniform, 
internationally coordinated manner. 
6. Take steps towards a single global regulator for large highly leveraged 
institutions that have signiﬁ  cant border-crossing activities. 
The domain of the single regulator/supervisor has to be congruous with 
the domain of the market and the domain (geographically and as regards 
activities) of the systemically important highly leveraged institutions. 
An important interim step is to create a single U.S. regulator and a single 
EU-wide regulator for large highly leveraged institutions that have signiﬁ  cant 
border-crossing activities.
highly leveraged institutions, and are key to cleaning up of banks´ balance 
sheets (through mark-to-market accounting rules) and to a resumption of 
securitization markets. There should be common rules on who gets access 
to the toxic asset dumps managed by different nations. There also should be 
common methods for valuing illiquid assets, lest the same asset gets valued 
in different ways at different national TARPs, putting excessive strain on the 
public ﬁ  nances of the country offering the highest valuation. 
Institutional reform
1. Increase the ﬁ  nancial resources of the IMF
Its current lending capacity (about $250 billion) is peanuts. If any of the 
larger emerging markets (Turkey, Brazil, Indonesia, Poland, or Korea) gets 
into trouble, $250 billion will be gone before you can say “Special Drawing 
Rights.” An additional $750 billion would be the minimum required for the 
IMF to play a helpful part putting out emerging market ﬁ  res; $1.75 trillion 
would be required for the IMF to be able to act in a systemic emerging 
markets crisis without ﬁ  rst having to arrange bilateral ﬁ  nancial support for 
the intervention by a number of deep-pocket national governments, each 
one of which would then have effective veto power over the program.
2. Reform the G7/8
There is an urgent need to constitute a new G7/8 comprising the U.S., the 
EU (represented at the head of government/head of state level by the EU 
presidency – adopting the Lisbon Treaty would be helpful here), Japan, China, 
India, Brazil, Saudi Arabia and possibly Russia or South Africa. 
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Returning to narrow banking*
by Paul de Grauwe, Professor, University of Leuven and CEPR
Bubbles and crashes have been part of ﬁ  nancial markets for centuries. Allowing 
banks – which inevitably borrow short and lend long – to get deeply involved 
in ﬁ  nancial markets is a recipe for disaster. The solution is to restrict banks to 
traditional, narrow banking with traditional oversight and guarantees, while 
requiring ﬁ  rms operating in ﬁ  nancial markets to more closely match the average 
maturities of their assets and liabilities.
Banks inherent instability
It is useful to start from the basics. Banks are in the business of borrowing short 
and lending long. In doing so they provide an essential service to the rest of us, 
that is, they create credit that allows the real economy to grow and expand. 
This credit-creation service, however, is based on an inherently fragile system. If 
the banks´ depositors or lenders are gripped by collective distrust and all decide 
they want their money back, bank will go broke; the money is not there since 
the deposits were invested in illiquid assets. This is how a liquidity crisis erupts, 
setting in motion an devilish cycle of insolvency and new liquidity crises.
*This piece ﬁ  rst appeared in “The essays: What G20 leaders must do to stabilise our economy 
and ﬁ  x the ﬁ  nancial system,” edited by Barry Eichengreen and Richard Baldwin, a VoxEU.org 
publication, 2008. http://VoxEU.org
7. Permit capital controls and barriers to entry by foreign entities into national 
or regional (EU) ﬁ  nancial markets and industries, in cases where there is not a 
single regulator/supervisor for the markets/instruments or for the entities and 
their foreign parents, subsidiaries and branches in all countries where they 
are active. 
8. Create a uniform global regulatory framework for rating agencies. 
Eliminate their quasi-regulatory function. Make it impossible to combine 
rating activities with other proﬁ  t-seeking activities in the same legal entity. If 
payment of rating agencies by the issuers is to continue, the selection of the 
rating agency should be done by the regulator, not by the individual issuer.
9. Don´t waste time on multilateral surveillance.
The IMF will never have any inﬂ  uence on large member states with strong 
government budgetary positions and strong external positions.
4. Strengthening 
 the  Global 










markets. Banks´ balance sheets became the mirror images of bubbles and 
crashes occurring in the ﬁ  nancial markets. An explosive cocktail of credit and 
liquidity risks was created that was waiting to explode. 
The failed Basel approach
The Basel approach to stabilize the banking system is based on an attempt to 
model the risks universal banks take and to compute the required capital ratios 
that will minimize this risk. Such an approach is unworkable. The risks that 
matter for universal banks are “tail risks”, that is, events which are extremely rare 
but which cause extremely large losses – like AIG´s near bankruptcy, or Lehman 
being allowed to go broke. Such risks cannot be accurately modeled (a key 
element of the Basel approach) precisely because they are so rare.
The only workable approach to ensuring bank stability
This leaves only one workable approach. This is a return to narrow banking in 
which the range of activities in which banks are allowed to engage is narrowly 
circumscribed. In this approach banks are excluded from investing in equities, 
derivatives and complex structured products. Investment in such products can 
only be performed by ﬁ  nancial institutions, for example, investment banks, 
which are then forbidden from funding these investments by deposits (either 
obtained from the public or other commercial banks).
Repeal of stability regulation
We learned from the Great Depression that in order to avoid such crises we 
have to limit risk taking by bankers. We unlearned this lesson during the 1980s 
and 1990s when the banking sector was progressively deregulated, thus giving 
banks opportunities to seek high-risk investments. The culmination of this 
deregulatory movement was the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999 under 
the Clinton administration. This ended the separation of the commercial and 
investment banking activities in the U.S. – a separation that had been in place 
since the 1930s banking collapse. Repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act opened 
the gates for U.S. banks to take on the full panoply of risky assets (securities, 
derivatives and structured products) either directly on their balance sheets or 
indirectly through off-balance sheet conduits. Similar processes of deregulation 
occurred elsewhere, in particular in Europe, blurring the distinction between 
investment and commercial banks, and in the process creating “universal banks”. 
It now appears that this deregulatory process has sown the seeds of instability 
in the banking system.
The critical lack of a ﬁ  rebreak
Financial markets have, for centuries, been gripped by speculative fevers that 
have led to bubbles and crashes; bubbles and crashes are an endemic feature 
of ﬁ  nancial markets. But ﬁ  nancial market problems do not automatically affect 
banks. In the most recent crisis, bubbles and crashes would not have been a 
major problem had banks not been involved so deeply in ﬁ  nancial markets. 
Banking sector deregulation, which started in the 1980s, is what exposed 
the banks so catastrophically to the speculative dynamics inherent in ﬁ  nancial 
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International coordination to avoid a classic, regulatory race to the 
bottom
A return to narrow banking can only occur if it is embedded in an international 
agreement. This is where the G20 comes into the picture. When only one or a 
few countries return to narrow banking, the banks of these countries will face 
a competitive disadvantage. They will lose market shares to banks less tightly 
regulated – a result that would produce forceful lobby against the restrictions. 
In the end, the governments of these countries will yield and the whole process 
of deregulation will start again.
A comprehensive international agreement will be necessary to remodel banking 
systems and to separate commercial banks from investment banking activities. 
This is what a Bretton Woods II conference should focus on. Clearly there are other 
desirable reforms, such as improving the incentive structures of bank managers 
and rating agencies, and a better representation of emerging countries in the 
IMF. The focus of Bretton Woods II, however, should be to reform the banking 
system so that it does not get involved in bubbles and crashes that are endemic 
to ﬁ  nancial markets.
In a nutshell a return to narrow banking could be implemented as follows:
￿ Financial institutions would be forced to choose between the status 
  of a commercial bank and that of investment bank.
￿ Only the commercial banks would be allowed to attract deposits from 
  the public and from other commercial banks and to transform these 
  into a loan portfolio with a longer maturity (duration).
￿  Commercial banks would beneﬁ   t from the lender of last resort 
  facility and deposit insurance, and would be subject to the normal 
  bank supervision and regulation.
￿ The other ﬁ   nancial institutions that do not opt for a commercial bank 
  status would have to ensure that the duration of their liabilities is on 
  average at least as long as the duration of their assets. 
This last point would imply, for example, that they would not be allowed to 
ﬁ  nance their illiquid assets by short-term credit lines from commercial banks.
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At least as important as exchanging ideas and information and harmonizing 
regulatory practices, which are the putative goals of the Basel Committee, the 
FSF and the College of Supervisors, are actual consequences for countries that 
fail to meet the standards they prescribe. How do we go about getting them?
At the more ambitious end of the spectrum, Stijn Claessens has proposed 
creating an international bank charter for banks engaged in cross-border 
activity. Internationally active banks would have to receive a charter from an 
international College of Supervisors, and they would be subject to its supervision. 
When the members of the College determined that banks were in violation of 
its charter, it could impose cease-and-desist orders, limit the operations of said 
institutions, and require remedial action. This would be a great outcome were 
it only feasible. Unfortunately it is not. U.S. ofﬁ  cials and politicians, among 
others, would clearly regard it as a bridge too far.
Somewhat less ambitious but more politically realistic, I would argue, is my 
proposal for a World Financial Organization (WFO) analogous to the already-
existing World Trade Organization. Membership would be obligatory for 
all countries seeking freedom of access to foreign markets for domestically 
chartered ﬁ   nancial institutions. The WFO would deﬁ   ne obligations for its 
members; the latter would be obliged to meet international standards for 
supervision and regulation of their ﬁ  nancial markets and institutions. It would 
appoint independent panels of experts to determine whether countries were 
in compliance with those obligations. Importantly, it would authorize the 
How to prevent future crises: create a 
World Financial Organization
*
by Barry Eichengreen, George C.Pardee and Helen N. Pardee, Professor of Economics and 
Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley
In the wake of the “second Bretton Woods conference,” expectations have fallen 
to earth. It should now be possible to discard overheated rhetoric about the end 
of Anglo-Saxon capitalism and get to work. The work in question should center 
on strengthening the ﬁ  nancial system. Purely national regulation is inadequate. 
The cross-border spillovers and negative externalities thrown off by subpar (one 
is tempted to say “subprime”) regulation are simply too great. At the same time 
there is no appetite for a global regulator. We will get a global regulator at 
about the same time we get a global army and a global police force.
Given that neither national nor supranational regulation is feasible, the challenge 
is to carve out something in between. This is where the intellectual challenge 
and interesting issues lie. What has been done along these lines to date – the 
Basel Committee of Banking Supervisors and the FSF – is not enough or we 
wouldn´t be in the current mess. Nor is it obvious that a College of Supervisors 
along the lines suggested by the members of the EU will differ signiﬁ  cantly from 
the status quo. The idea and its name will make the academics among us think 
of department meetings in our own colleges where every member of the faculty 
gets a say and at the end of which nothing much is decided.
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Least ambitious of all would be to simply try to raise the reputational costs for 
countries whose domestic regulatory practices are not up to snuff. Proposals for 
the FSF and the IMF to provide ﬁ  rmer surveillance of national regulatory practice 
move in this direction. Gordon Brown, for example, would have the FSF deﬁ  ne 
acceptable practice and the IMF determine whether national regulation meets 
that standard. 
But is the FSF adequately legitimate and accountable, given its membership? 
(We will have to see whether the G20 follows through on its November 
15th communiqué and appropriately expands the FSF.) Does the Forum have 
adequate staff? Does the IMF, for its part, have the backbone to take on its 
large shareholders when their national practices are not up to snuff? Doesn´t 
this proposal presuppose a more politically independent IMF? You will forgive 
me: this is a case that some of us have been making for going on ten years. It 
is hard not to have mixed feelings on hearing prominent politicians like Horst 
Koehler now endorse this idea when they have not exactly stuck their necks out 
in the past.
The weakest step of all, if the conclusion is that all of the above are impractical, 
is to create an independent commission to provide an annual evaluation of the 
adequacy of regulatory practice. Some will dismiss even this out of hand. But 
think of it as analogous to the European Commission evaluating the adequacy 
of national budgetary practice in the context of the Growth or Stability Pact, 
imposition of sanctions against countries that failed to comply. Other countries 
would be within their rights to restrict the ability of banks and nonbank ﬁ  nancial 
institutions chartered in the offending country to do business in their markets. 
This would provide a real incentive to comply.
The move to a WFO would presumably occur after some years of satisfactory 
experience with a GATT-like predecessor if the history of the WTO is any guide. 
It will be objected that the U.S., among others. would never let an international 
organization dictate its domestic regulatory policies. The rebuttal is that the 
WFO would not dictate. The speciﬁ  cs of implementation would be left to the 
individual country. There would still be scope for the U.S. and other members 
to tailor supervision and regulation to the peculiarities of their national ﬁ  nancial 
markets. 
But those regulatory speciﬁ  cs would have to comply with the broad principles 
set down in the WFO charter and associated obligations. We already do the 
equivalent for trade. Dispute settlement panels already determine whether, 
inter alia, U.S. tariffs on timber imports from Canada are in compliance with 
our WTO obligations. If not, we have the choice of whether to change those 
laws or face sanctions and retaliation. If the U.S. and other countries accept this 
in the case of trade, why should they not accept it for ﬁ  nance?
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Five proposals to improve the robustness 
of global ﬁ  nancial institutions 
by Wolfgang Münchau, co-founder and director of Eurointelligence Advisers Limited, 
associate editor of the Financial Times
A well designed regulatory framework should ensure that ﬁ  nancial institutions 
are robust when confronted with economic shocks, ﬁ  nancial  innovation, 
regulatory arbitrage, as well as higher than average asset price volatility. The 
standard response is for long lists of regulatory measures. I am proposing an 
approach routed in economic analysis and political economy instead.
1. The most important regulatory principle that should be adopted is what I call 
“principle of economic intent.” 
It means that we should not draw up long legal rules that try to anticipated 
every circumstance (Basel I and II were just that), and that can always 
circumvented given a sufﬁ  cient degree of ill will. Instead one should introduce 
an element of constructive ambiguity on the part of the banks by allowing 
regulators to use economic analysis in their decision-making. 
An example: a credit default swap may be technically a swap, but it is 
economically insurance. It should thus be regulated like an insurance market, 
unless there are traded on regulated exchanges, in which case the exchange 
regulator is responsible. The rule would obviate any need to pass complex 
regulation about how to push the CDS market on to regulated exchange. It 
would happen naturally, if an insurance regulator was entitled to regulate 
everything he regards as insurance. 
where experts are allowed to tell countries “your budget is recklessly out of 
control.” Why couldn´t a similar Commission similarly tell national governments 
“your ﬁ  nancial supervision is recklessly out of control?” 
The answer, presumably, is that the members of the EU, because their internal 
market is so integrated, recognize ﬁ  scal spillovers to be of ﬁ  rst-order importance. 
Well, we now all recognize that cross-border ﬁ  nancial spillovers are of ﬁ  rst-
order importance, so what is possible in Europe should be possible globally. 
Another answer is that the European Commission has the legitimacy needed 
to undertake this task, embedded as it is in the larger process of European 
economic and political integration. Well, if this is the answer, then we need to 
endow our multilateral ﬁ  nancial institutions with comparable legitimacy.
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3.  We should explicitly impose ceilings on the overall size of ﬁ  nancial 
institutions. 
This is more important than setting maximum leverage ratios, which is very 
problematic. In particular, no ﬁ  nancial institution should ever be allowed to 
grow too large to fail. As for existing too-large-to-fail institutions we should 
subject them to a special regulatory regime with a view to breaking them 
up into smaller units. Concretely, we could require a ﬁ  nancial institution not 
to accumulate assets beyond a certain threshold of the host country´s 
annual GDP.
4. The single most appropriate measure to increase transparency in the credit 
markets is to introduce a global credit register, which is technically possible, 
as long as the main OECD countries co-operate. 
This would give central banks and regulators real-time information about 
systemic credit risks, and the ability to intervene much earlier.
5. Finally, here is one, and only one, proposal for a speciﬁ  c micro-regulatory 
change, concerning the regulation of rating agencies. On this issue I would 
follow the advice of Charles Goodhart´t roundtable of ﬁ  nancial economists.
 
Another example: if banks seek “regulatory relief” through the use of 
securitization, this should be regarded for what it is: a purely legal trick 
that does not change the underlying economics. Regulators should thus be 
empowered to count off-balance sheet exposure or even to bring it back 
onto the balance sheet. That rule alone would probably have prevented the 
worst abuses in the market for securitized credit products.
2. In recognition of the global ﬂ  ows of ﬁ  nance, we should adopt a three-stage 
proposal to establish, successively: 
A.  Global co-operation, and more effective exchange of information. 
B.  Joint rule-making with national implementation. 
C.  A degree of global implementation by a global regulator, yet to be 
 established. 
Global co-ordination and co-operation is necessary for rule number one to 
work in practice. Otherwise, ﬁ  nancial institutions will engage in cross-border 
regulatory arbitrage, and we would be back to where we started from. To the 
extent that global regulation is not realistic, we should adopt intra-regional 
regulation, for example, at EU, or Asean level – and then co-ordinate between 
those blocks.
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What is to be done – and by whom? 
Five separate initiatives*
by Avinash Persaud, Chairman, Intelligence Capital Limited
There are ﬁ  ve separate initiatives the authorities need to follow to contain 
the crisis, reverse some of its effects, and prevent it from happening again. 
National authorities are best positioned to respond quickly to contain the crisis, 
international initiatives are required to avoid repetition, and some combination 
of the two is best suited to reversing its effects. National authorities can best 
contain the crisis through two measures.
First, as Willem Buiter has argued, they must revive interbank markets by 
providing a temporary guarantee for short-term unsecured lending between 
regulated institutions. Central bank disintermediation of interbank markets is 
more costly and less sustainable.
Second, national authorities should also inject preference share capital to 
institutions that need it on condition of a partial swap of “old” debt for equity. 
Such involvement by government is best carried out at arms length – in Europe´s 
case, the European Investment Bank may be a good vehicle.
A critical part of the current crisis is that write-downs of asset prices have so 
depleted bank capital that many banks are close to insolvency on a mark-to-
market basis. These write-downs are caused by the distress prices obtained 
when selling instruments today that the market cannot easily value because 
of their complexity and uncertainty over their rating. This leads to the next 
necessary initiative.
*This piece ﬁ  rst appeared on VoxEU.org  on Oct. 9, 2008.  http://VoxEU.org
A.  Make the rating agencies´ mathematical models transparent. 
B.  Governments, central banks, and other public sector institutions 
  should refrain from using rating agencies in an ofﬁ  cial  capacity 
  (central bank should not value collateral on the basis of ratings, 
 for  example). 
C.  In the rating of securitized products, ratings agencies should 
  publish a margin of error depending on leverage of the securitized 
 structure.
Those ﬁ   ve rules could be a useful start for much more robust ﬁ  nancial 
framework. The basic principle one should follow is not to over-regulate, 
but to change the economic incentives of the participants in the ﬁ  nancial 
markets.
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Capitalise on the crisis: 
How to move forward
*
by Richard Portes, Professor of Economics, London Business School, and Founder and 
President of the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
The ﬁ   nancial crisis offers opportunities for reform. The IMF and Financial 
Stability Forum should be refocused and beefed up, the G7 scrapped, the G20 
reshufﬂ  ed, and group memberships suited to the issues. Leaders should agree 
on principles, rather than getting bogged down in details, and explain their 
reforms to the public.
It is no help to say “if you want to get there, you shouldn´t start from here”. We 
are where we are. And crises offer opportunities, not only to clever investors, 
but to reform-minded politicians. Political leaders can seize the day and lead 
the reforms, with academics providing ideas. A “New Bretton Woods” is an 
evocative but misleading shorthand for the task and the opportunities ahead. 
Even in the medium run, no new institutions should or will emerge, no global 
macroeconomic structure or exchange rate system will be devised. Nor will a 
single country be able to impose its vision. That makes the task harder. Real 
progress on some of the major issues will require a “grand bargain”, whose 
outlines I shall sketch. But there are other areas where all should realise they 
could be better off even without difﬁ   cult tradeoffs. In a crisis, nothing is 
impossible. We have already seen policy initiatives that were unimaginable only 
a few months ago. But those who advocate massive state intervention will be 
disappointed. This is not a crisis of capitalism nor the market economy, unless 
bad policies make it so.
*This piece ﬁ  rst appeared on VoxEU.org  on Nov. 12, 2008. http://VoxEU.org
The third thing the authorities should do is to support a more immediate 
reversal of this process by facilitating the creation of long-term liquidity pools 
to purchase assets – rather like John Pierpont Morgan´s 1907 money trusts. 
These pools are best managed by those with long-term liabilities like insurance 
companies and funds with investor lock ups, but the authorities could capitalize 
these liquidity pools by issuing ten-year government bonds. Under existing rules, 
these pools would not mark-to-market, and it is better that long-term investors, 
not governments, buy assets on a strictly commercial basis. These liquidity 
pools need to operate internationally and therefore need to be capitalized and 
organized internationally. The IMF may perform this co-ordination role.
Looking ahead to the next crisis
This is the seventh international ﬁ  nancial crisis I have lived through. At the 
end of each, the focus on avoiding the next one has always been the same 
trinity: more transparency, more disclosure, and more risk management. This is 
an inadequate response to systemic crises. At the heart of new, internationally 
coordinated regulatory initiative, there must be counter-cyclical capital charges. 
Crises do not occur randomly; they always follow booms. That is my fourth 
policy initiative.
But there also needs to be a shift in the focus of regulation, away from sensitivity 
to the market price of risk and notions of equal treatment for all institutions to a 
greater sensitivity to risk capacity and a better appreciation that diversity is the 
key to liquidity. This is the ﬁ  fth step.
Systemic resilience requires different risks being held in places where there is a 
natural capacity for that type of risk. In the name of risk-sensitivity and equal 
treatment we ended up with institutions that had no liquidity holding liquidity 
risk and those with little capacity to hedge or diversify it owning credit risk.
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Principles for the agenda
Some of the desirable principles are broad. The leaders must state their consensus 
that they will not retreat into protectionism nor try to turn back globalisation, and 
that they are conscious of the dangers of overregulation. They should indicate 
that they want strategies to exit in due course from the extraordinary degree 
of new direct government involvement in ﬁ  nancial institutions and markets. 
International ﬁ  nancial integration and domestic ﬁ  nancial development, going 
hand in hand, promote economic growth. So they should take a stand against 
ﬁ  nancial repression and repression of ﬁ  nance. They should explicitly recognise 
the macroeconomic roots of the crisis in global imbalances, rather than just 
blaming it on unbridled greed. They should acknowledge that the international 
institutions are unrepresentative and therefore lack legitimacy and that they are 
poorly coordinated and in some respects ill suited to deal with key problems.
They could be more speciﬁ   c. The agenda should include ﬁ   nding ways to 
cut the vicious circles that have made the crisis so grave – the interactions 
among inappropriate accounting practices, opaque derivative markets, credit 
ratings, and deleveraging. Financial regulation must be better designed, 
more comprehensive, more harmonised across countries, and indeed more 
multilateral. It should focus on incentives as well as on rules. Enforcing greater 
transparency is also a legitimate and important function of regulation. And the 
major countries, in particular the U.S. and the U.K., must recognise the dangers 
of regulatory competition and arbitrage.
Don´t get bogged down in details
Expectations for the G20 meeting on 15 November may be excessive. It will not 
agree on changes to the institutions of global governance, nor will it come up 
with an “n-point plan” for dealing with the crisis. Its primary objective should 
be to bolster conﬁ  dence by convincing the public and market participants that 
the leaders understand the issues and have a clear process for confronting them 
with a reasonable timetable. Commentators should not say afterwards, “Fine 
principles, but where are the details?” The leaders should convince us that this is 
a mistaken demand, that their demonstration of unity on the principles and the 
process goes side-by-side with the short-run measures they are already taking. 
And if, for example, wide-ranging ﬁ  scal stimulus is necessary (as I believe it is), 
governments are learning that already and need not act explicitly in concert.
They face a new conﬁ  guration: greater interdependence in both trade and 
ﬁ  nance, higher global risks, more links among global issues, all in a context 
of huge disruption to international ﬁ  nance. No decoupling, only deleveraging. 
Some of the problems are not fully understood. It would be unwise to seek 
agreement now on speciﬁ   c reforms. Rewriting rules should be the job of 
technocrats, not politicians – if only because the politicians are understandably 
inclined to ﬁ  nd scapegoats, shoot (or guillotine) the speculators, and shut down 
markets. But political leadership must set out the principles and how ofﬁ  cials 
should proceed in implementing them.
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The central institutions for implementing these principles are the International 
Monetary Fund and the Financial Stability Forum. The latter should not 
be subsumed into the former. The structure and governance of the IMF, its 
universality, are inappropriate to regulate the international ﬁ  nancial system, in 
which only a small number of countries are important and no ﬁ  nancial resources 
are required. Instead, the FSF should take on many of the multilateral regulatory 
activities suggested above, with executive authority and a broader membership. 
It should include all the countries that are now important in the global ﬁ  nancial 
system. The leaders could now state that this is their intention. The FSF should 
be responsible for the Financial Sector Assessment Programs that the IMF now 
administers – and they should be mandatory for all countries, even the largest.
Where would that leave the IMF? It cannot be an international lender of last 
resort, in the strict sense, nor should it be a ratings agency (for sovereigns), nor 
prescribe “equilibrium” exchange rates. The Fund should conduct surveillance of 
macroeconomic policies and current accounts, and henceforth perform explicit 
capital account surveillance as well. One short-run measure to which the leaders 
should agree is to increase the resources available to the Fund to deal with the 
crisis-induced needs of many emerging market countries running large current 
account deﬁ  cits or facing major capital outﬂ  ows.
The IMF must be prodded to come up with new ideas and revive some of 
the old ones. The Fund has manuals on how to restructure distressed banking 
systems – where are they? What are the Fund´s ideas on the key macro issues? 
For example, the Fund should be examining the carry trade: why was it so 
A new regulatory framework should be based on the principle that ﬁ  nancial 
institutions no longer fall into distinct categories – commercial banks, investment 
banks, insurance companies, hedge funds, and other ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms all now 
overlap. And all require at least regulatory oversight, with varying degrees 
of intrusive regulation. Those with global or regional systemic importance 
require global regulation that goes beyond national regulatory authorities and 
incorporates burden-sharing rules to deal with failures. Outsourcing regulation 
– as, for example, by “hard-wiring” the ratings agencies into the regulatory 
framework – should be abandoned, eliminating the “regulatory license” that the 
agencies now have. Self-regulation should be re-examined with considerable 
scepticism. Often greater transparency will enforce regulation, so regulators 
should require it, e.g., by bringing over-the-counter derivatives trading (in 
particular, the CDS market) onto exchanges.
Ofﬁ   cials should ask economists and lawyers who specialise in contracts, 
incentives and mechanism design to put forward proposals for regulating 
executive compensation, refocusing managers on longer-term performance, 
and reducing conﬂ  icts of interest. Principles should relate micro to macro, e.g., 
acknowledging the procyclicality of the Basel II structure (which would not be 
cured by substituting leverage ratios for capital adequacy ratios). And on the 
macro side, the leaders should come down against global capital controls but 
agree that individual countries may reasonably turn to capital account measures 
in appropriate circumstances (with IMF assistance rather than opposition), while 
not reversing ﬁ  nancial market reforms. They should not seek exchange rate 
target zones, grids, or reference rates. They should recognise, however, that 
exchange-rate movements have often been excessive, sometimes abrupt, with 
frequent prolonged misalignments, so that exchange-rate management is often 
warranted (in which sterilised intervention can be effective).
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has to accept that its primary objective should not be to protect the City of 
London, which will not lose its central role in international ﬁ  nance even if there 
is more multilateral regulation. China must take on the full responsibilities of a 
country with $2 trillion in international reserves and some of the largest banks 
in the world. Japan should play a much more active and positive role in these 
discussions than it has so far. And most importantly, the U.S. must accept that 
we are long past Bretton Woods, and it cannot maintain sole leadership and 
veto power in the international ﬁ  nancial system.
In the medium run, this could lead to a grand bargain, in which the central 
players would be the U.S. and China, but with a key role for the EU (in particular, 
the euro zone). China and other major reserve holders would use their excess 
reserves to recapitalize the major ﬁ  nancial institutions and would change their 
domestic policies to reduce their excess savings and hence their current account 
surpluses. The U.S. would stop China-bashing on both trade and exchange 
rates. The U.S. and EU would agree on bringing China into the FSF and raising 
its weight in the IMF. The EU would recognize that it would have more inﬂ  uence 
in the Fund if it would act jointly, so it would concede that as a set of countries 
it is currently over-represented and that at least the euro zone should have only 
a single representative. And the U.S. would give up its veto.
So what is feasible? To agree on principles, though not in the full detail set 
out above and to set up working groups with ﬁ  xed but different timetables. 
The working groups should cover the structure of ﬁ  nancial regulation, issues in 
proﬁ  table for so long, how did it affect the capital accounts and exchange rates 
of “target” countries (most of which are now on the IMF rescue list), and how 
is it related to the foreign exchange swap market? Most importantly, perhaps, 
the Fund must fully take on the role of “relentless truth telling” that Keynes 
expected of it.
What about the G7, and indeed the G20 itself? The former is an anachronism 
and should simply be abandoned. It cannot discuss decoupling and recoupling, 
global imbalances, exchange-rate adjustment, or the obligations of surplus 
countries. A smaller group (with the euro zone having a single representative) 
should deal with global imbalances and the like, and larger, appropriately 
constituted groups with other issues highlighted above. Most of the relevant 
players are in the G20, but some in the G20 are not always relevant. In principle, 
the memberships should be suited to the issues – a kind of variable geometry.
What they must do
But the key to progress on most of these issues lies in the willingness of major 
countries to accept some basic propositions. Germany must achieve a deeper 
understanding of the issues at stake, rather than focusing on whether other 
countries are just trying to get Germany to bail them out. France has played a 
more constructive role, but it is still inclined to blame “neoliberalism” and press 
for policies that will surely be unacceptable to the U.K. and the U.S.. The U.K. 
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What remains to be done to overcome 
the ﬁ  nancial crisis
*
by Dennis J. Snower, President, Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Professor, 
Christian-Albrechts-University Kiel
To gain perspective on where the solutions to the ﬁ  nancial crisis lie, we need a 
clear picture of what mistakes led us into the crisis, how they could be overcome, 
and which of them have not yet been tackled. Here, in broad brush strokes, is 
my list of mistakes that policy-makers have not yet addressed – problems that 
need to be solved quickly if the ﬁ  nancial nightmare is to be put to rest.
Excessive taxpayer sacriﬁ  ce: the authorities in all the troubled economies have 
responded in roughly the same way to the crisis – namely, by providing capital 
to threatened ﬁ  nancial institutions in return for an equity stake. Unfortunately, 
nobody seems to have thought deeply about how the burden of the bailout is 
to be shared among the taxpayers, stockholders and bondholders.
Clearly, we should have burden sharing. If taxpayers should carry the entire 
burden, reckless ﬁ   nancial practices would be rewarded, encouraging even 
more reckless activity in the future. If stock- and bondholders were to carry 
the burden alone, the banks would not be sufﬁ  ciently capitalized to fuel an 
economic revival.
*This piece ﬁ  rst appeared as “A Long Way to Go – The mistake that policy makers must address 
soon to end the ﬁ  nancial nightmare” in the Wall Street Journal on Nov. 12, 2008.
ﬁ  nancial regulation, issues in market structure and the transparency of markets 
and ﬁ  nancial instruments, the roles of the IMF and FSF. Governance of the 
Fund should be left for later, although giving the International Monetary and 
Financial Committee of the IMF executive powers should be considered now, as 
should increasing IMF funding for new facilities and rapid action.
We have no time for the doctrine of unripe time – and if there ever was a 
moment for wide-ranging reform, this is it. But the political leaders must put 
great effort on selling all this to a fearful and sceptical public.
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So governments should turn their equity over to trust companies which are 
given the task of selling the acquired shares over a limited period – say, 10 years 
– with the sole objective of maximizing proﬁ  t. Thereby the taxpayers´ potential 
loss would be minimized. Yet so far, this has not happened.
Deﬁ   cient regulation and supervision: ﬁ   nancial regulation and supervision 
remains essentially national. Policy-makers – and voters – need to recognize that 
this practice is unacceptable. One reason why we have fallen into the ﬁ  nancial 
crisis is that ﬁ  nancial transactions were undertaken where the regulation was 
weakest. This “regulatory arbitrage” allowed ﬁ  nancial institutions to take risks 
without paying for them. The only way to avoid this danger in the future is 
through international harmonization of regulation and supervision.
To increase the chance of agreement, it is worth setting modest goals. At a 
bare minimum, we need international coordination of capital requirements. 
These requirements must depend on the degree of transparency and simplicity 
of the underlying ﬁ  nancial products. For instance, they must be higher for 
complex structured credit products such as collateralized debt obligations of 
asset-backed securities than for simple products with few counterparties. In our 
globalized ﬁ  nancial system, we need equal regulation for equal risks – not only 
in the banking sector, but also in the shadow-banking sector: money-market 
funds, hedge funds, investment funds, private-equity ﬁ  rms, etc. Anything short 
of this leads us back into the quagmire of regulatory arbitrage and reckless risk-
taking.
Ideally, governments should decide how to share the burden and then implement 
the decision by combining their equity purchases of ﬁ  nancial institutions with 
the imposition of debt-for-equity swaps on the bondholders. Taxpayers would 
contribute to the bailout by funding the governments´ equity purchases, 
bondholders would pay via the swaps, and stockholders would contribute 
through the dilution of their equity.
What has actually happened is that governments have offered eye-popping 
amounts of capital to the ﬁ   nancial institutions without demanding any 
simultaneous contribution from the stock- and bondholders through debt-for-
equity swaps. This policy is misguided: investors worry that the promised capital 
injections by the government may be insufﬁ  cient to save the ﬁ  nancial institutions; 
taxpayers worry about their exposure; and the stock- and bondholders aren´t 
required to shoulder their fair share of the risks. Debt-for-equity swaps should 
become a central pillar of the ﬁ  nancial bailout.
Such swaps are nothing new. When creditors give bankrupt ﬁ  rms a second 
chance by forgoing some of their claims in return for equity, they are effectively 
engaged in debt-for-equity swaps. Of course, governments may in fact wish 
to make the stock- and bondholders contribute in the future. But the current 
absence of a transparent, well-deﬁ  ned plan generates needless uncertainty and 
thereby prolongs the weakness of our ﬁ  nancial system.
The missing exit strategy: having purchased shares in troubled ﬁ  nancial 
institutions, governments need to specify how they intend to return this equity 
to the private sector. This is important, because governments are generally 
less capable of running banks than bankers are, particularly once appropriate 
regulation is in place. Financial markets are likely to suffer if the partial 
nationalization of banks is open-ended.
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Buyers of last resort would effectively eliminate the possibility that large, 
contagious ﬁ  nancial institutions become insolvent. Once the ﬁ  nancial market 
players realized this, the deadly mistrust would disappear, banks would start 
lending to one another, asset values would recover, and the risks of contagion 
would fall. The crisis would be over.
Thus far governments have formulated no transparent rules about which 
institutions are to be saved and it appears that their proposed bailouts fall far 
short of solvency guarantees. Thus uncertainty lingers.
In short, we still have a long way to go in tackling the root causes of the current 
ﬁ  nancial crisis. Many of the mistakes that got us into this mess continue to 
prevail. In building a vision for a new Bretton Woods agreement, governments 
would do well to focus to pursue the straightforward solutions to the four 
problems above.
The failure to tackle the solvency problem: the crux of the current ﬁ  nancial crisis 
is a solvency problem. At rock-bottom asset prices, many ﬁ  nancial institutions 
run the risk that their assets will fall short of their liabilities, making them 
insolvent. Bailing out institutions on a case-by-case basis, as they begin to fail, 
is a disastrous policy since it spreads fear and mistrust throughout the ﬁ  nancial 
system, which contributes to the failure of yet other institutions.
To solve this problem, ﬁ  nance ministries should become “buyers of last resort” 
for systemically important ﬁ  nancial institutions – that is, institutions that are 
too large and contagious to be allowed to fail. Speciﬁ  cally, ﬁ  nance ministries 
should give these institutions a solvency guarantee and, in return, impose 
special regulatory requirements. The solvency guarantee would be implemented 
through a combination of a government capital infusion and debt-for-equity 
swaps. This means the systemically relevant ﬁ  nancial institutions would have 
a clear choice: either they accept the solvency guarantee and the associated 
regulation, or they restructure their business so that they do not potentially 
pose a systemic threat.
Again, to avoid regulatory arbitrage, some international coordination will 
be necessary. The criteria for evaluating assets and liabilities would need to 
be harmonized. Cross-border burden-sharing agreements for multinational 
institutions should be made in advance. For if they are made after an institution 
becomes insolvent, governments are unlikely to provide sufﬁ  cient capital since 
they will have national, rather than transnational, interests at heart.
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advanced economies to a more balanced conﬁ  guration. More seriously, it is not 
clear where the natural stopping point is – and that is creating fear, feeding 
back into investment and operating behavior.
Value investors are largely sidelined. That is understandable in part, because 
jumping in too early, particularly in the ﬁ  nancial sector, produced losses; and 
now the asset deﬂ  ation has spread to all sectors, reﬂ  ecting the corresponding 
damage on the economy side, why take the risk? But much more importantly, 
in this high speed downward spiral, with the balance sheets adversely impacting 
the income statements and vice versa, it isn´t clear what the intrinsic values are. 
They are endogenous to the system as are investor expectations. Increasingly 
both will be determined by what governments do.
One would not want to use the term equilibrium in this kind of volatile situation, 
but whatever the correct term, the dynamics appear to be such that there are 
multiple places to bottom out, more or less rank orderable by either the extent 
of asset deﬂ  ation or the reduction in economic activity.
The channels underpinning the dynamics are clearer. One is an inability to 
intermediate credit that threatens business viability and aspects of household 
consumption. This has largely been dealt with on an emergency basis, as has 
the deposit risk associated with bank failures. The second one is still operating 
and has a ﬁ  rst order impact. It runs from reduced asset values combined with 
extreme uncertainty about the extent of future declines, to the real economy 
via consumption and with a short lag on employment, investment and expected 
proﬁ  ts.
Balance sheets and income statements: 
breaking the downward spiral
*
by Michael Spence, Nobel Laureate, Professor Emeritus of Management, 
Stanford University
The crisis we are now in globally had its origins in an asset bubble fuelled by 
the interaction of excessive leverage and a widespread underestimation of the 
endogenously rising systemic risk – roughly the degree to which individual 
risks were becoming highly correlated via balance sheet linkages. The potential 
seriousness went unnoticed or not fully understood (by market participants, 
regulators and commentators) for several years.
That is no longer the case. It has been known for some time that leverage 
had to be reduced, asset values reset down and consumption levels reduced 
for a period of time, at least in the developed economies. I believe that we 
underestimated the extent of the potential damage to the real economy that 
would result from the feedback loops connecting balance sheets and the 
decisions that underlie the income statements (consumption, employment and 
investment) throughout the economy, in the ﬁ  nancial, business and household 
sectors. These interactions are at the centre of the current downward spiral.
But it is now worse than this dynamic might have implied. The declines in 
asset prices and real economic activity are in danger of going well beyond 
any reasonable assessment of what would have been required to restore the 
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To address the interacting deﬂ  ationary effects, we need not just a signiﬁ  cant 
stimulus package (global if possible, credible, and announced in advance) but 
a larger and much more systematic program of buying assets. Housing and 
mortgages would be a good place to start. Without such a systematic program, 
asset deﬂ  ation will very likely for an extended but unknown period of time undo 
some of the beneﬁ  cial effects of a stimulus package and vice versa. Further, asset 
values are driven (except for some of the technical factors operating now) by 
expectations. These adjust very quickly and hence can cause damage quickly.
Addressing the asset deﬂ  ation side of the challenge is crucial. It is also very 
hard. In these circumstances, intrinsic values are endogenous variables. The 
point of the intervention is not so much to guess at them accurately but rather 
to affect them positively. Trying to change an “equilibrium” outcome is much 
more complex than assessing asset values in a fairly stable environment. There 
are not many market price signals to use as reference points, leaving the public 
sector as investor open to a wide variety of critiques. And perhaps fortunately, 
they and we don´t get much chance to practice beforehand.
There are few natural circuit breakers that interrupt these channels. The capital 
adequacy vacuum in the developed countries spread rapidly to the developing 
world in the form of emergency capital outﬂ  ows, creating negative exchange 
rate dynamics and credit issues that had little to do with conditions in these 
economies. The potential damage has been partially reduced by a reversal of 
these capital outﬂ  ows by the IMF, by the use of reserves and by dollar swap 
facilities from the Federal Reserve.
The global system has become highly interconnected and non-compartmenta-
lized, and hence quite fragile. It makes the dynamics more vicious as few parts 
of the global economy seem to be sheltered.
Preventing a serious overshoot in the balance sheet–income statement 
downward plunge is a co-ordination problem. Intrinsic value and hence investor 
behavior is determined in part by consumer and business behavior and vice 
versa. The co-ordination problem in breaking the cycle and the need for 
simultaneous action is in part understood: the G20 summit was right to focus 
on protectionism and coordinated ﬁ  scal stimulus to avoid beggar-thy-neighbor 
and free-rider problems.
Government is the only entity that has the capacity to intervene in a coordinated 
way to shift the dynamics by weakening the reinforcing two-way linkages, with 
the goal being to cause a deceleration in the rate of decline and ultimately to limit 
the negative overshoot in assets and economic activity. Not only are governments 
(including central banks) the only natural candidates for this function, they have 
also become major players in the system. It is crucial that their future behavior 
becomes predictable. Because one is dealing with expectations on the asset side 
especially, communication and credibility are important as well as action.
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We cannot regard the current events as just one more protracted period of high 
ﬁ  nancial market volatility, to be followed sooner or later by a return of investors´ 
expectations and risk premia to more comfortable levels. The ﬁ  nancial crisis has 
already proved to be a watershed for the international ﬁ  nancial system and it is 
changing the attitude of public authorities towards banking and capital market 
regulation. It might also deeply affect the propensity of private investors to take 
risks. It will not be business as usual anymore.
The global banking crisis that still engulfs intermediaries and markets threatens 
to cast a shadow on the very notion that ﬁ  nancial markets could be a reliable 
source of retirement income. More than the never-ending dispute of the pros 
and cons of equities versus bonds, the focus is increasingly on the ability of 
ﬁ  nancial markets to assure workers a sufﬁ  cient level of retirement income even 
over long-term investment periods. Beyond the unresolved issue of aggregate 
longevity risk, we need to think whether workers should be left alone to deal 
with ﬁ  nancial markets tail risks (that is, the fact that extreme losses tend to be 
more frequent than it would be by chance in normal conditions). 
Even the decision to join a pension fund (where private pension plans are not 
mandatory) is likely to be seriously affected by the crisis. Investors´ conﬁ  dence in 
the soundness of ﬁ  nancial intermediaries and markets has been shaken and this 
may well spread disaffection among workers, notably with respect to pension 
funds´ deﬁ  ned contribution (DC) schemes. Workers may feel less able than in 
the past to make difﬁ  cult decisions about the appropriate level of contributions 
and dependable asset allocation.
Retirement saving and the payout 
phase: how to get there and how to 
get the most out of it*
by Ignazio Visco, Deputy Director General, member of the Governing Board, 
Banca d´Italia
Times are changing for pension funds
The ﬁ  nancial crisis reinforces the need to develop effective ways of protecting 
retirement saving. But it may make it harder to adopt appropriate instruments 
to hedge the risks that may in the long term affect the payout of pension 
beneﬁ  ts.
The severity of recent ﬁ   nancial market developments certainly justiﬁ  es  the 
tendency to concentrate on the short term. The crisis is especially costly for 
senior workers, whose pension wealth, both inside and outside pension plans, 
has been dented by the sharp decrease in asset prices. As in previous ﬁ  nancial 
markets downturns, some of these workers may react by postponing retirement. 
In certain cases this might not be enough, and an argument could be made 
for public intervention (for instance, in the case of workers near to retirement 
whose pension beneﬁ  ts would mostly derive from mandatory private pension 
schemes). This situation also calls, however, for measures to improve the future 
working of pension systems. The current crisis has only highlighted the urgent 
need for better-functioning markets and better retirement products, if future 
retirees are to be guaranteed adequate living standards.
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A factor discouraging workers from increasing pension fund contributions is 
the relative illiquidity of their net equity in pension funds. DC pension schemes 
usually grant workers the possibility to withdraw their balances some time 
before they retire only under special circumstances. Any option to grant higher 
ﬂ  exibility of early withdrawals (maybe to those categories of workers, such as 
young and low-paid workers, that are more likely to be liquidity-constrained) 
has to be carefully weighted against the risk that short-sighted and time-
inconsistent workers might withdraw too much too early, against their own 
long-term interest. 
This naturally leads us to underline the importance of providing DC plan members 
with good investment returns, as this would be the main way to alleviate the 
relative illiquidity of investments in pension funds and improve the trade-off 
between liquidity and pension fund returns. In this respect, it is essential to keep 
total costs to savers low.
Cost reductions can come not only from increasing the volume of assets under 
management, with consequent economies of scale, but also from stimulating 
competition among pension schemes. This may call for several measures 
including educating consumers about the effect of charges on pension fund 
returns; assuring a high degree of transparency and comparability of charges 
between different schemes; easing the transferability of employer contributions 
across different schemes, especially for people with term jobs and interrupted 
careers; and intensifying competition among intermediaries offering pension 
fund asset management services. 
Moreover, in all countries public authorities have a powerful (and relatively 
Retirement saving should increase further
The present crisis creates problems for deﬁ  ned-beneﬁ   t (DB) pension plan 
sponsors (which are the residual risk bearers of the plan) as falling asset prices 
reduce asset/liability ratios and might ultimately require higher contributions. 
Partial relief is provided by the increase in yields on corporate bonds, which are 
used in several countries to discount pension fund liabilities.
 
Even more importantly, the crisis may make deﬁ  ned-contribution (DC) plan 
members less conﬁ   dent about taking complex decisions. DC plans require 
workers to make a number of difﬁ  cult choices, such as whether or not to enroll, 
how much money to contribute, how to invest it and when to rebalance the 
portfolio. A serious risk that DC plan members face is not saving enough for 
their old age. Contributions to DC plans tend to be low. 
Two widely used instruments to increase pension fund enrolments and 
contributions are ﬁ  scal incentives and employer-matching contributions. Both 
are effective means of boosting pension fund returns and greatly increase the 
convenience of joining a funded retirement scheme. Both have drawbacks, 
however. Fiscal incentives are usually expensive, regressive, and possibly prone 
to time inconsistency, especially when tax advantages apply to the payout 
phase. Employers´ contributions might be offset by a reduction in net wages 
and not necessarily produce an increase in the worker´s total wealth. Moreover, 
as they are typically the result of agreements between employers and trade 
unions, their portability across different retirement schemes may be far from 
seamless. In any case, workers seem to exploit ﬁ  scal incentives and employers´ 
contributions only partially. 
4. Strengthening 
 the  Global 










Should we move from unprotected to protected DC schemes?
Basing asset allocation on the past properties of asset returns may leave the 
investor considerably exposed to investment risk, for at least two reasons:
￿  First, past realizations may come from different underlying economic regimes 
  or conceal structural breaks, so that care should be taken when using 
  observed returns to estimate expected returns.
￿  Second, even if expected returns on equities are higher than those on bonds in 
  the long term, actual returns on equities may turn out to be sharply 
 negative.
The investment risk can be dealt with, to some extent, by relying on market-
based instruments. DC plan members could invest a large share of their funds in 
risky assets at the beginning of their accumulation period and gradually increase 
the percentage of cash and government bonds as they approach retirement. 
This could be done by accumulation schemes that automatically adjust risk as 
an investor ages (“life-cycle funds”). This kind of solution has been increasingly 
adopted for DC pension plans in a number of countries.
Financial markets also offer strategies that drastically reduce the exposure to 
investment risk. One possibility is to restrict portfolio choices to ﬁ  xed-income 
instruments, especially index-linked bonds, or to use options. Then there is 
recourse to rate-of-return guarantees provided by third parties (an insurance 
company, the sponsor or a central reserve fund). A DC pension fund may also 
maintain a reserve to smooth returns over time: in good investment years part 
of the fund´s returns are placed in the reserve, which can be drawn on when 
they fall below a certain threshold.
inexpensive) instrument for boosting pension fund contributions – namely, the 
provision of information. The better workers are informed, the quicker they 
revise their expectations and adjust their saving patterns. Workers should be 
given systematic, timely and clear information to help them make reliable 
estimates of replacement ratios, taking into account both mandatory retirement 
programs and supplementary pension plans. 
Another powerful instrument in the hands of both employers and policymakers 
is the design of retirement plans in terms of enrolment, contribution, investment 
and withdrawal options. In deﬁ  ning default options, there seems to be consensus 
on a few general criteria such as avoiding opt-in clauses (which imply that the 
worker is not enrolled unless he or she asks) and relying instead on opt-out clauses 
or some kind of more active decision-making; offering only a small number of 
basic investment choices, while being ready to offer a wider choice to those 
workers that ask for it; and setting employee contribution rates that rise slowly 
over time. All these solutions are meant to encourage long-lasting changes in 
behavior and to overcome inconsistencies in individual decision-making arising 
due to short-sightedness, inertia, procrastination or lack of willpower.
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One possibility is a more active role of the state in providing insurance against grave 
systemic risks. Tail risk in ﬁ  nancial markets is similar to what is called aggregate 
longevity risk, that is, the risk of a whole cohort living longer than expected. 
Of course, providing insurance against catastrophic events destroying ﬁ  nancial 
wealth was the reason why PAYG social security systems were introduced, most 
of them in the aftermath of the Great Depression and of the hyper-inﬂ  ation 
following WWII. However, social security systems came under strain in most 
developed countries for several well-known reasons. In particular, the sizeable 
(and largely unexpected) increases in longevity, coupled with a substantial fall in 
fertility rates, put the ﬁ  nancial sustainability of traditional PAYG schemes under 
question in many countries, unless substantial cuts in beneﬁ  ts and increases 
in payroll contributions were introduced (and the effective retirement age 
increased). 
Yet, there are other ways to provide workers with a collective protection against 
ﬁ  nancial market risks. One example, is the plan put forward by Franco Modigliani 
and co-authors. The proposal is to introduce a single funded DC pension 
scheme, which would enter in a swap arrangement with the Treasury each year 
so that the risky pension fund returns are exchanged with a guaranteed rate of 
return. 
One merit of the Modigliani proposal is that workers with similar characteristics 
would be granted similar rates of return on their savings. The scheme would put 
the burden of aggregate ﬁ  nancial risks due to events that cannot be hedged at 
a cohort level within a truly intergenerational exchange framework. Obviously, 
this would call for the introduction of measures to limit the burden on future 
generations caused by high and rising levels of public debt. 
While ﬁ  nancial markets offer different ways of introducing minimum return 
guarantees, it is clear that the hedging of ﬁ  nancial market risks does not come 
without cost. A higher incidence of ﬁ  xed-income instruments may take its toll 
on portfolio returns; the use of derivatives or third-parties guarantees implies 
the payment of fees. With intertemporal smoothing of returns, good investment 
years subsidize bad investment periods, with a potential redistribution of 
investment income across plan members. Therefore, all these forms of protection 
from investment risks may result in lower net-of-fees returns. If these are not 
offset by higher contributions during the accumulation phase, they lead to a 
lower pension during the decumulation stage – that is, lower returns imply 
lower consumption, either during working age or in retirement or both.
More importantly, market-based solutions cannot protect investors from strong 
aggregate shocks hitting several asset classes and economic sectors at the 
same time. In such an event, aggregate wealth is not only redistributed across 
individuals and sectors, but it is also destroyed.
One might argue that in such exceptional circumstances there is a straightforward 
solution: a public rescue of pension funds by the government (especially when 
enrolment is mandatory rather than voluntary). A bail-out of pension fund 
members would always be an available policy option, but should always remain 
the last option for two well-known reasons: it is costly to taxpayers and it may 
encourage opportunistic behavior by pension funds in the future.
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decumulation phase should be made more widely available. At the moment, for 
example, in most countries annuity payments are not indexed to prices. 
To keep the price of annuities as low as possible, governments and regulators 
should ﬁ  rst of all promote the timely release of accurate mortality tables, as this 
would help to reduce the aggregate longevity risk. 
Furthermore, in order to foster competition and keep proﬁ   t margins low, 
product prices and characteristics should be as transparent and comparable 
as possible. To guarantee a higher degree of transparency, both about prices 
and about product characteristics, it would be advisable to follow the path of 
countries such as the U.K., where the Financial Services Authority hosts a web 
platform in which the different products are compared, or Chile, which has 
recently adopted a similar system.
With reference to the inadequate range of available instruments, governments 
should ﬁ  rst of all remove the obstacles that prevent companies from offering 
inﬂ  ation-indexed annuity products. In particular, they could consider providing 
more inﬂ  ation-indexed and ultra long-term bonds. 
The market for reverse mortgages should also be promoted. Reverse mortgages 
and similar products transform into an annuitized stream of payments a 
component of the wealth of elderly people which is already signiﬁ  cant  in 
many countries where private pension wealth is still small. There is a risk that 
the crisis, and the sharp drop in house prices, will give a hard blow to these 
products, which grew signiﬁ  cantly in the years of the housing boom. Better-
designed arrangements, in which the risk is shared more equally between the 
homeowner and the intermediary will also help. 
We need cheaper and safer pay-out products
An adequate level of pension wealth at retirement is necessary but not sufﬁ  cient 
to guarantee adequate living standards during the retirement years. Indeed, it 
is important to ensure that such wealth is properly decumulated. Therefore, the 
most important choice is the extent of annuitization.
It is difﬁ  cult not to agree that annuitization of a signiﬁ  cant fraction of private 
pension wealth is highly advisable. It is indeed advisable both for the individual 
and for the government. 
At the moment, annuity markets around the world are rather thin, except in a 
handful of countries in which private pensions are more developed (such as in 
the UK, Switzerland and Chile). However, in a few years´ time the number of 
pensioners for which annuities or annuity-like products will provide a signiﬁ  cant 
fraction of retirement income is most likely to increase. This is due both to the 
increased importance of private pensions and to the fact that, in many countries, 
the law now mandates that a minimum portion of a worker´s pension fund 
capital should be annuitized at retirement (or it provides strong tax incentives 
to do so). 
As the demand for annuity products takes off, an efﬁ  cient and well-functioning 
annuity market will become soon a policy priority. Policy action in this ﬁ  eld 
should target two broad goals. First, in order to reduce annuity prices, three 
main determinants should be addressed: adverse selection costs, which are quite 
signiﬁ  cant according to most existing studies; the premium for the aggregate 
longevity risk; and a possibly insufﬁ  cient degree of competition. Second, payout 
products that protect at least in part against the risks that materialize during the 
4. Strengthening 
 the  Global 










The main reason why there is an inadequate supply of instruments for hedging 
against the risks incurred in annuity provision (longevity risk, inﬂ  ation  risk, 
ﬁ  nancial market risk) is of course the lack of natural issuers, at least in the 
private sector. Due to their extended time-horizon, governments are a natural 
candidate to reinsure these risks.
But it is not clear to what extent they could take those risks onto their balance 
sheets. After all, social security systems are being reformed mainly to spare 
future workers at least part of the expected costs of population ageing (a 
concern that is also behind the introduction in several countries of the so-called 
notional deﬁ  ned contribution schemes for public pensions). One might argue, 
however, in favor of some limited form of guarantee to annuity providers, to 
cover only the risk of a “catastrophic” tail event. The use of public resources to 
provide an insurance against the collective component of longevity risk should 
then be matched by a more balanced composition of pension pillars that would 
limit the exposure of the government to the idiosyncratic component of this 
risk and encourage ﬁ  nancial markets, to play a larger role for its insurance, even 
if with a possible smoothing role by the state along the lines discussed in the 
previous section.
The state could even intervene directly as an annuity provider. This would be 
likely to reduce administrative costs (thanks to economies of scale) and adverse 
selection costs (due to a wider pool of clients), and correspondingly reduce 
prices (mainly because proﬁ  t mark-ups could be kept to zero). 
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To make growth inclusive, especially in poor countries, put emphasis 
on providing the legal and institutional framework to enable people 
to engage in commerce and entrepreneurship. This can take many 
forms, such as giving people secure property rights, microﬁ  nance and 
mesoﬁ  nance.
One important way of improving employment creation is by providing access 
to business infrastructure as well as guaranteeing a legal and institutional 
framework for strengthening and enhancing entrepreneurial activities. It 
is especially important to encourage the development of legal and ﬁ  nancial 
institutions that serve the poor.
At a very microeconomic level, access to the legal system, property rights 
and services such as savings channels and ﬁ  nance services (which collectively 
determine the ability of people, especially poorer people, to engage in 
commerce and carry out entrepreneurial ventures) is crucial for making growth 
more inclusive.
Challenge
Entire countries as well as certain socio-economic groups within countries have 
been excluded from the beneﬁ  ts of globalization. The rise of “modern” economic 
activities typically beneﬁ   ts a limited number of people, thereby producing 
considerable inequality. This pattern may not prove sustainable if it does not 
become more inclusive.
How can the beneﬁ   ts from globalization be shared more equally within 
countries? How can we generate sustainable growth? In sum, how can we 
make growth more inclusive?
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sector. Where there are natural limits to labor mobility, provide public 
goods that support regional development, ﬁ  nanced through redistri-
butive taxation. 
Growth will not occur uniformly over regions. But some combination of mobility 
(where people move to employment opportunities) and public investment at   
the regional level to increase growth and compensate for less than complete 
aspects of mobility are important. Improving regional and local government 
effectiveness is a key ingredient for successful sustained growth.
GESolution 4
Protect people in transition between jobs through training, income sup-
port and access to essential basic services like education. Do not try to 
protect people by protecting companies and jobs.
Protection in transitions created by the turbulence of the competitive process and 
the dynamics of structural transformation might be important for smoothening 
periods of adaptation. Protection might include income support and rock 
solid access to basic services like education and health rather than protecting 
companies or jobs.
GESolution 2
Remove obstacles to labor force participation by counteracting discrimi-
nation and investing in education across the entire population. Such 
education investment should aim to promote equality of opportunity; 
it can be ﬁ  nanced through redistributive taxation, thereby promoting 
income equality.  Women should be given equal access to schooling 
and subsequent employment through goverment transfers, access to 
ﬁ  nance and other support. 
The priority for achieving a more inclusive pattern of growth is to ensure “equality 
of opportunity”. This includes the absence of explicit exclusionary provisions 
in law or society and access to education and job opportunities. While some 
income inequality might be inevitably linked to high and sustained growth rates, 
it is vital to counter the long-run exclusion of certain segments of society.
GESolution   3
To spread growth across regions, remove obstacles to labor mobility, 
such as through widespread education and the creation of special 
economic zones, with less employment regulation than in the formal
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Panelists Background
Globalization has been the engine of growth and prosperity in many countries 
in the past 30 years. Yet some of the poorest countries in the world have 
made little progress or even experienced economic decline. Even within many 
successful countries, the gains from increased integration have not been broadly 
shared. Almost universally, the process of globalization has led to increasing 
inequalities. Some of these dynamics are inevitable, others amenable to policy 
interventions. 
Inclusiveness is crucial for sustainable long-run growth, and deserves to be 
a priority in growth strategies and policies. The Commission on Growth and 
Development noted that all the known cases of sustained high growth have 
large amounts of incremental productive employment as a prominent feature 
and thus have great potential for reducing poverty.
Despite this fact, there is both rising resistance to globalization and rising income 
inequality in much of the advanced and developing world. Not all or even most 
of the rising inequality is attributable to globalization at least in advanced 
countries. Nevertheless, globalization is often identiﬁ  ed as the culprit.
Regardless of the origins of rising income inequality, failure to deal with equity 
and inclusiveness is a policy mistake in both developed and developing countries. 
An open global economy is the fundamental underpinning of the sustained 
high growth and poverty reduction that has occurred in the past 30 years and 
more generally in the post-war period.
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Support the creation of institutions that enable poor countries to beneﬁ  t 
from globalization by strengthening global institutions that facilitate 
economic integration and debt relief, and granting poor countries access 
to developed countries´ markets, especially in agriculture.
Global institutions – primarily the WTO, the International Monetary Fund, the 
World Bank and the United Nations – have to be strengthened again. These 
institutions should support developing countries by encouraging their integration 
into world markets and by brokering a debt relief program to facilitate new 
cooperation without the burdens of the past. The developed countries should 
grant developing countries access to their markets, especially the agricultural 
markets, and the OECD countries should expand international development 
partnerships.
Governments should resist running away from the distributional consequences 
of globalization by hiding behind protectionist walls. The detrimental effects of 
such an approach on national income levels would be tremendous, and labor 
markets would be affected by rising unemployment, which would add further 
to social fragmentation. Quite the contrary, openness to globalization can be 
expected to generate the private and public revenues required to mitigate social 
fragmentation. An important incentive to open up to the globalization process 
is the prospect of integration into a prosperous community of states such as the 
EU, serving as an anchor for internal and external stability.
1
Challenge
Globalization and social fragmentation are the two controversial issues that will 
determine the future world order. Globalization promises to yield substantial 
beneﬁ  ts for all participating countries, but not necessarily for each individual 
or each group within countries in the short term. Groups of people may suffer, 
especially in emerging markets where social security nets cannot provide for 
compensation and smooth the growing gap between rich and poor. But is 
it high time to tame the markets to stop social fragmentation? Or quite the 
contrary, do we need more market liberalization to overcome conﬂ  icts that have 
their seeds in a vicious circle of poverty and oppression?
Globalization makes small countries economically viable. As a result, 
globalization represents an opportunity for small countries to develop and 
become autonomous. Therefore, an immediate consequence of globalization 
could be claims for political separatism of small regions. Hence the peaceful 
disintegration of large states becomes a challenge in the globalization process.
Could the reduction of centralization, especially of large states, be a channel 
for coping with the challenges of globalization in social fragmented countries, 
allowing ethnic groups to achieve their desired autonomy without the 
consequences of violence?
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Consider successful models of federalism, supported by the principle of 
subsidiarity, as blueprints to contain social fragmentation.
Successful models of federalism, such as the U.S. and Switzerland, should be 
considered as political blueprints to achieve a balance of interests between 
ethnic, social or religious groups within large and heterogeneous countries. 
The principle of subsidiarity should rule domestic governance and serve as 
the key for achieving internal stability and successfully building supranational 
communities.
For example, in the U.S. of the 19th century, there was a clash of interests 
between different religious and ethnic groups, especially along the differences 
of Protestant, Catholic and Jewish communities. These divisions gradually 
eroded both economically and socially. This coming together occurred because 
the religious groups shared work and schools as well as identiﬁ  cation with a 
common community – that of the U.S. nation.
1
GESolution 2
Through aid and political process, help poor countries help themselves by 
encouraging them to invest in social security and education systems.
The developing countries have to make a contribution of their own to tackling 
social fragmentation. A precondition for poor countries beneﬁ  ting  from 
globalization is building up stable democratic institutions and sufﬁ  cient social 
security systems as well as investing in education at the different skill levels.
Poor countries should not shield themselves from globalization but open up 
and develop a suitable business climate that will attract investments, bringing 
in new technologies. In the course of growing prosperity, these countries would 
become able to develop a suitable social environment, thus gaining internal 
stability and establishing a balance of interests.
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Use educational institutions, notably universities not just to develop 
marketable skills, but also to create awareness of our comprehensive 
responsibility to overcome social fragmentation through the 
acknowledgement at our common destiny.
To introduce new thinking about global society, educational institutions may 
serve to spread the idea of comprehensive responsibility. Most of the future 
leaders in politics and economy are passing through university courses. At this 
critical moment in their development, they can be impressed indelibly by role 
models that mirror global responsibility.
The idea of comprehensive responsibility is a vision that will need much time to 
take shape. A time horizon of at least three generations appears to be realistic. 
A generation dedicated to the solution of fundamental environmental problems 
might become a driving force for the implementation of this idea.
1
GESolution 4
Accept some redistribution of globalization proﬁ  ts to ﬁ  nance a social 
security net.
In the long run, new thinking based on the insight of comprehensive global 
responsibility is desirable. It would mean sacriﬁ  ces in favor of the poor members 
of the global society, comprising the interests of socially deprived groups as well 
as future generations in the development of global networks of cooperation 
and the establishment of mutual trust.
As one consequence, globalization proﬁ   ts should be partly redistributed to 
ﬁ  nance a social security net. The indispensable tax burden has to be accepted 
as an insurance premium for political stability.
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Globalization is considered to be a “trigger” for social fragmentation and conﬂ  ict, 
but it is not an underlying cause. Public institutions that can ensure social 
security nets and the participation of all members of society in the beneﬁ  ts of 
globalization are key to tackling social fragmentation.
In particular, well-established democratic institutions are crucial. The higher 
the level of political rights and civil liberties in a country, the higher are the 
costs of social conﬂ  icts and the less prone the country is to social conﬂ  icts. In 
multi-ethnic societies, proportional democracies that provide a higher level of 
political inclusiveness turn out to have a lower probability of social conﬂ  icts than 
majoritarian democracies. But if ethnic groups are geographically concentrated, 
the political institutional framework is more efﬁ  cient if democratic institutions 
are organized as federal bodies that avoid the exclusion of any relevant 
communities. 
Furthermore, the opening of a country and its integration into global or regional 
communities promotes consolidation of democratic institutions, thus alleviating 
the social pains of globalization. Openness ensures economic recovery and 
democratic institutions.
To bring about a sustainable change in the world´s value system in favor of a 
comprehensive global responsibility, the values of a global society should be 
developed from childhood, as traditional social values and cultural norms are 
difﬁ  cult to change.
1
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GESolution 6
Promote political and social tolerance for the peaceful disintegration of 
large states and reintegration of regions.
In a world of global markets, large centralized nation-states will be increasingly 
threatened from below by regional separatism and from above by the growth 
of “supranational” institutions akin to the EU that try to capture economic 
advantages of scale. Therefore, the peaceful disintegration of large states is a 
further challenge in the globalization process.
Allowing the disintegration of states and the creation of new nations will be 
the natural consequence of an increase in economic autonomy. The creation 
of small homogenous nations as members of large areas of “imperial size,” 
which provides public goods such as defense, security, trade agreements, 
communication networks and common currencies, could be an option to ensure 
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GESolution   1
Change educational systems to emphasize analytical thinking and 
problem solving instead of rote learning.
Our current educational systems have evolved in response to the needs of a 
strong manufacturing sector; future educational systems may evolve as a 
response to the needs of a strong “neurofacturing” sector. Neurofacturing is 
creative work that used to be done with pencil and paper, but is now done with 
knowledge equipment that greatly ampliﬁ  es the productivity of the talented. 
Capabilities like getting to work on time and learning to follow orders, which 
are emphasized in the present school curricula, appear to be less helpful for 
neurofacturing. Thus, if school curricula do not change, we will probably 
continue to see an inadequate match between people´s skill and the aptitudes 
demandet by globalization, as well as an associated rise in income inequality.
2 Challenge
Inequality has long been a problem in developed and developing countries, but 
the continuing technological changes at the workplace may be creating a new 
dimension of inequality. Information technology is likely to have a bigger impact 
on the productivity of the talented and thus on their income. New technological 
equipment for knowledge workers and communications innovations tend to 
reduce the need for “helpers” and, at the same time, have increased the intensity 
of competition for mundane tasks and standardized products, in some cases on 
a global scale.
What are the implications of these developments for the ﬁ  ght against poverty 
and inequality? Are we moving towards an income distribution with great 
rewards for talent and otherwise stagnating incomes? Do we need new forms 
of insurance against income loss, new forms of redistribution? Can governments 
mitigate inequality in a self-adjusting way? 









GESolution   3
In developed economies, do not compensate the losers from  globalization 
through protectionist measures, but rather through compensatory 
education and progressive taxation. 
By laying an infrastructure and education foundation that is supportive of 
neurofacturing, an economy may move towards a specialization of production 
with little overlap with low-wage countries. Importing goods and services that 
are no longer produced within a country will not affect its domestic degree 
of inequality. To achieve such a favorable pattern of specialization, positive 
attitudes towards lifelong learning have to be internalized.
Rising inequality does not appear to be a problem of globalization; rather, 
it reﬂ  ects the willingness or capability of governments to react. First of all, 
governments should not blame international trade or immigration as the 
prime cause of increasing inequality. Because technological change and not 
globalization lies at the heart of the problem, governments should not attempt 
to compensate the losers by protectionist measures but rather by educating and 
retraining the disadvantaged and taxing the income of the winners.
2 GESolution 2
Encourage educational systems to celebrate students´ idiosyncratic 
abilities.
For example, educational systems should allow for multiple tracks 
towards creative craft jobs of all varieties and at different levels of 
complexity in order to enable people readily to ﬁ   nd a niche in the global 
economy. Such jobs will often share physical and mental components. 
Talent and intellectual ability are highly multi-dimensional, and a 
one-size-ﬁ  ts-all educational system is not going to suit the abilities of most 
students that will be needed in neurofacturing.










Rising income inequality in many countries around the world has raised concerns 
about globalization as its primary cause. The reason is that the overall welfare 
gains and the distributional effects of globalization appear to be two sides 
of the same coin. New offshoring and outsourcing activities of multinational 
enterprises in various services sectors have further contributed to the impression 
that global competition may be the driving force behind stagnating wages and 
reduced employment opportunities in general, and especially of low-skilled 
workers.
But there is very little empirical evidence that the outsourcing and offshoring 
of standardized services by multinational enterprises have led to signiﬁ  cant 
aggregate effects on domestic wages. The direct effects of globalization on 
wages for workers with different skill levels would come about by a change 
in the terms of trade, which is not taking place as yet. Hence the problem of 
rising inequality appears to be mainly driven by technological change, not by 
globalization as such.
2 GESolution 4
Embrace a new yardstick for measuring wellbeing, putting less emphasis 
on material goods and more on personal relationships and social 
achievement.
A post-industrial economic system that heavily relies on neurofacturing seems 
destined to move towards a more unequal income distribution, notwithstanding 
any successful compensatory education and progressive income taxation. Both 
measures are not likely to be enough to offset the disappointment from the low 
wages that may result for a large number of workers from the transition from 
industrial to post-industrial economies.
A new yardstick for wellbeing would place less emphasis on material criteria 
such as our labor income or the speed and size of the car we drive. Instead, it 
would count, for example, the number of real friends we have and the social 
good that we do.
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Panelists 2 This means that rising inequality would probably prevail even without the 
outsourcing and offshoring of impersonally delivered services. This is not to deny 
that closer global economic integration can strengthen competitive pressures in 
some parts of the economy (see “Skills for the New Wave of Globalization”).
Nevertheless, protectionism is not a solution for the problem of rising inequality, 
as emphasized in the section on “Tackling social fragmentation”, which also 
highlights the need for a new yardstick of wellbeing that emphasizes personal 
relationships and public service instead of individualistic materialism.
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Give  “working longer than before” the highest priority in reform 
packages to cope with the challenges of population ageing.
The most important measure is to remove the early retirement schemes in both 
public and private pension arrangements, which reduce the work incentives of 
older workers. An incremental increase in the eligibility age for pensions (with 
consideration of the physical and mental health development of the elderly over 
time) is probably of high relevance, but very difﬁ  cult to implement politically.
In addition, further reductions in working hours should be avoided. Instead, it 
seems appropriate in some countries to increase weekly working hours again. 
In several countries, it is desirable to accompany this approach with policies to 
raise women´s labor market participation, particularly by reducing their burden 
of care for children and the very old. 




As populations age in many countries, there will be fewer prime-aged people 
to care for the growing numbers of the elderly. Increasing pension and medical 
care expenditures will raise governments´ or families´ ﬁ  nancial burden. Higher 
taxation on earned income to cope with the increased ﬁ  nancial burden runs the 
risk of impairing people´s incentives to work and acquire education throughout 
their lives.
Policy-makers face a three-pronged ageing syndrome: pension systems, health 
care, and employment for all. We cannot design a pension system without 
reference to the health care costs and to overall employment conditions. Nor 
can we design a health care system or labor market regulations without taking 
account of their inﬂ  uence on pension ﬁ  nance.
Which joint reforms of pension, health and employment systems would enable 
ageing societies to maintain (or even increase) the living standards of all? Should 
these systems encourage the elderly to prolong their working lives and how 










Promote further health care reform to enhance the productive use of 
older manpower, emphasizing not only physical health problems but 
mental health problems as well. 
Health expenditures are an investment for a longer healthy life – both for a 
longer working life (which should encourage employers to invest more in the 
health of their workers) and a healthier retirement (which should encourage 
workers to invest more in their own health). 
Health care reform is crucial. Although health care costs tend to increase 
substantially with technological progress, the extended productive use of older 
manpower may mitigate the increase in costs. It is also essential to improve the 
efﬁ  ciency of health care management.
Health care reform should also go beyond research on new medicines for 
physical health problems, paying more attention to the mental health problems 
that have become more prevalent in the 21st century.
GESolution 2
Encourage employers to retain their workers as they get older, such as 
by retraining, creating  ﬂ  exible working conditions, and granting tax 
subsidies.
Employers should recognize the advantages of keeping workers when they 
are getting older because of their valuable experience, know-how and “know-
who”. They should also note the broad variety of instruments available to 
sustain the productivity of older workers at their disposal, for example, creating 
an appropriate working environment, more ﬂ  exible working conditions such 
as part-time work, and the provision of further education for updating the 
capabilities and the knowledge of the older workers. Such arrangements can 
help older workers coordinate the working lives and private lives more easily, 
taking account of their health condition.
Tax subsidies are an option for enhancing the incentives for employers to keep 
their ageing workers. The magnitude of these subsidies should be related to 
opportunity cost of supporting older workers in retirement.












Correct popular misconceptions about ageing through dissemination of 
information and research.
Informed discussions may help to combat widely held misconceptions about 
ageing. For example, it is a fallacy that keeping older workers will squeeze 
out jobs for younger workers: there is empirical evidence that keeping older 
workers actually encourages the creation of more jobs for younger workers.
Misconceptions about ageing may be more prevalent in economically backward 
regions or countries. To help these places cope with ageing problems, more 
developed regions or countries should share their knowledge. Researchers have 
an important role to play in translating results and giving policy advice to the 
general public as well as to politicians.
GESolution 4
Complement public pension systems with private insurance to raise 
opportunities for retirement saving and offer individuals more 
alternatives in health care.
The burden on future working generations is likely to increase as old-age 
dependency ratios rise substantially. If saving for retirement is increased, some 
positive effect on output per capita may result from the higher capital/labor 
ratios that result from higher savings, and the social conﬂ  ict inherent in “pay as 
you go” systems may be reduced.
Within a dual system, more innovative ﬁ  nancial products will extend individuals´ 
ability to design their own ﬁ  nancial plans and accumulate their pension wealth 
according to their own interests. The provision of a stable, functional and 
innovative ﬁ   nancial system is a ﬁ   rst-order public assignment to cope with 
challenges of population ageing (see “Strengthening the Global Financial 
System”).
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Background
Population ageing is becoming a pervasive phenomenon not only in the 
developed world but also in many developing societies. The old-age dependency 
ratio in the more developed regions will roughly double to 33% between 2005 
and 2025; in less developed regions, it will reach 13%.
Under current pension systems and with no changes in present work and 
retirement patterns, population ageing would dramatically increase the 
pressure on public ﬁ  nances. This will, in turn, translate into raising the ﬁ  nancial 
burden on younger workers, and hence impair their work incentives, severely 
aggravating the ﬁ  nancial problems of current pension systems and amplifying 
potential social instability.
Many countries favor policies to raise fertility or to encourage immigration to 
mitigate labor shortages. A more comprehensive institutional reform package 
would be to bring individual incentives in line with the requirements for 
effectively and efﬁ  ciently tackling the ageing syndrome. But given differences 
between countries, there is no one-size-ﬁ  ts-all solution.
Because of the signiﬁ  cant and long-lasting effects of population ageing on 
economic growth and social stability, there is an urgent need for political 
leaders to forge a common consensus between governments, companies and 
individuals across generations to keep potential for conﬂ  ict at bay.
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Broaden the medical base, especially in developing countries, by crea-
ting a “doctor of the practice” degree, whereby individuals can become 
rural medical practitioners by apprenticing with a physician, but without 
the extensive medical training. Help hospitals in developed countries to 
donate their old equipment to a central organization that will redistri-
bute it.
With this lower barrier to the profession, there will be more practitioners in the 
ﬁ  eld at a lower cost. Local knowledge consistent with domestic culture – and 
sustained by the local communities and civil society – could be incorporated.
GESolution 2
For routine check-ups and basic health care, provide free clinics with 
limited scope of treatments and services at a controlled cost. 
They would not have the capabilities to conduct procedures or operations. The 
idea here is to create a standard for care that can be delivered at a predictably 
limited cost.
Challenge
Across the world, 1.3 billion people have no access to effective and affordable 
health care. Low and middle-income countries bear 93% of the world´s disease 
burden, yet account for only 18% of world income and 11% of global health 
spending. 
What systems of infrastructure, education and training are required in poor 
countries to support a well-functioning health care system? What governance 
structures are necessary to encourage the right mix of public and private health 
care provision? What regulatory framework is needed to induce businesses to 
provide insurance, provision and ﬁ  nance for health in poor countries? How can 
the fruits of medical knowledge and technologies be shared among rich and 
poor countries without destroying incentives to generate more knowledge? 
What forms of international cooperation are conducive to the ﬁ  nancing of health 
systems in developing countries? What international institutions are required to 
make health care for the poor an attractive opportunity for business? 
4. Financing 
 Health  Care 










Soften intellectual property rights, at least with respect to life-saving 
drugs, while maintaining the safeguards that preserve incentives to 
innovate.
In this ﬁ  eld, price discrimination models in favor of poor countries as well as 
subsidies for the latter are worth considering, provided however that safeguards 
against grey market transactions and arbitrage can be made effective. In 
addition, “advance market commitments,” which combine free access for poor 
countries with third-party provision of research incentives, could be promoted 
(see “Enabling Poor Countries to Share Knowledge”).
GESolution 3
Keep a well-deﬁ  ned role for the public sector in ﬁ  nancing and provision 
of parts of health care.
The public sector´s role can be augmented with NGOs, which have supplied 
effective delivery models in a variety of successful cases.
GESolution 4
Make improving preventative health care a pre-condition for obtaining 
more advanced forms of health care.
Ideally, this would make the need for preventative health care more salient, 
promote the idea that people have personal responsibility for their own health, 
encourage them to take action on their own, and reduce the overall cost of 
health care.
4. Financing 
 Health  Care 










Foster non-government, community-based health care insurance. 
Community-based health insurance is established through small local initiatives 
with voluntary membership. Programs have either been initiated by health care 
providers (for example, hospitals), NGOs or local associations. Schemes are 
generally limited to a speciﬁ  c region and insurance packages only offer limited 
coverage for certain medical treatments.
Community-based health insurance has the potential to integrate a large 
part of the rural population that would otherwise be left with no or very little 
health care. Besides offering moderate premia to their clients, such schemes 
can generally adapt better to the speciﬁ  c needs of their clientele than large 
government programs.
4. Financing 
 Health  Care 
  for the Poor
GESolution 6
Establish an international health fund to support a public-private health 
partnership for developing countries.
The enormous mortality and morbidity burden in the poorest developing 
countries can only be addressed by improving access to health care via a 
concerted, partnership-oriented strategy that is supported globally with ﬁ  nancial 
resources as well as know-how about good practices, and with national and 
community efforts to increase poor people´s access to essential health services. 
To promote efﬁ  ciency, priorities for the fund´s tasks should be clearly deﬁ  ned, 
for example, with respect to preventative care, control of diseases or providing 
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Health care issues have to be balanced in a complex ﬁ  eld of tension between 
the human right to health, personal responsibility, scarce ﬁ  nancial  funds 
and commercial viability. In reforming health care for the poor, there are no 
universal solutions, matching the problems of all poor countries equally. Nor 
can immediate solutions be expected in the short term. 
The provision of health care is a challenging task of combining areas of 
substantial economies of scale – for example, in the ﬁ  elds of diagnostics or 
medical technology – with a dispersed variety of differentiated local wisdom. 
So while the proposals all contribute to a global strategy to improve the access 
of poor countries´ populations to health care, each one has to be adjusted to 
the case in question.
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Make immigration policies for high-skilled immigrants much more open, 
such as by introducing a “blue card” for immigrants to the EU. Don´t 
allow concerns about a possible brain drain to stop the opening of labor 
markets for high-skilled immigrants.
The success of hot spots of the knowledge economy such as Silicon Valley or 
the City of London relies heavily on high-skilled immigration and illustrates that 
high-skilled immigration can create jobs for natives and have a positive impact 
on public ﬁ  nances. Efforts to introduce a “blue card” that grant high-skilled 
immigrants access to the entire EU labor market are welcome.
In an EU-wide system designed to attract high-skilled immigrants, some EU 
countries will be more attractive than others. Therefore the national labor markets 
effects of a blue card system are difﬁ  cult to predict. In fact, the proposed blue 
card system is more of a general “human capital accretion” mechanism rather 
than a system for ﬁ  lling high-skilled positions.
In countries that have such programs, such as Canada, there is evidence of 
substantial under-employment and underuse of skills by points tested high-skilled 
immigrants. This can be expected to be repeated in the EU unless a concerted 
effort to verify and recognize credentials and qualiﬁ  cations is undertaken in 
tandem with the launch of a blue card program. As a result, any future blue 
card system should be regarded as simply complementary to existing national 





The world is becoming more integrated through cheaper transport and 
communications. Yet large income differences persist between rich and poor 
countries. As a result, there continues to be considerable pressure for people to 
migrate from poor to rich countries, pressure that will only be exacerbated by the 
current economic crisis.
Migration between different developed countries and between different 
developing countries is also on the rise. There are potential conﬂ  icts of interest 
between the migrants and the population of the host country. The interests of 
migrants and the source population may also diverge.
Which policies in high-income immigration countries would help to ensure that 
international labor migration contributes to prosperity and equality of opportunity 
in both the host and source countries? How is high-skilled immigration to be 










Implement high-skilled immigration programs that rely on broad-based 
notions of skill, rather than the traditional notion of short-run “skill 
shortages.”
The narrow notion of “skill shortages” often used by immigration policies rests 
on somewhat shaky economic foundations and is excessively focused on labor 
market conditions in the short run. Forward-looking immigration policies – such 
as the Australian and Canadian points systems – based on multi-dimensional 
deﬁ  nitions of skill and a job offer promise better economic outcomes in the 
long run.
Present systems based on an employer guarantee for a sufﬁ  ciently high salary 
as in Germany and the Netherlands are readily incorporated into such a points 
system by awarding high numbers of points for high salary guarantees.
The notion of “broad-based skill” needs further attention for it to fulﬁ  ll its potential 
in practice. It must rest ﬁ  rmly on an understanding of the opportunities for 
labor substitution. For example, when there is a shortage of chemical engineers, 
it is not helpful to attract civil engineers, since the latter cannot be substituted 
for the former. Many high-skilled labor shortages are showing up in regulated 
professions, where the qualiﬁ  cation requirements are very precise.
of potential migrants outside of their borders who speak the national language. 
This fact limits the potential effectiveness of the European blue card. 
In some countries, there is a case for speeding up processing procedures for 
work and residence permits.
The impact of high-skilled emigration on source countries is ambiguous. In 
countries with extensive post-secondary education capacity, the potential for 
better earning opportunities abroad may act as an incentive to acquire more 
skills and may thus improve the overall skill level even of the non-migrant 
population.
Furthermore, labor markets in many developing countries do not provide 
productive employment opportunities for many bright young graduates. 
Nevertheless, aid aimed at increasing the supply of skilled workers in critical 
(high demand and high social value) occupations is desirable and should be 
coordinated among both developed and developing countries. 
5. Designing 
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Create a standing commission on immigration and to adjust immigration 
levels ﬂ   exibly in response to changing market and institutional 
conditions.
Market conditions relevant to immigration may change due to shifts in labor 
market institutions and in welfare state provisions, as well as business cycle 
movement and demographic variations. Furthermore, even when countries are 
very similar regarding their desired level of low-skilled immigration, their mix 
of irregular immigration, family-based migration and legal economic migration 
may be very different.
To adjust immigration policy in a timely manner when any of these relevant 
parameters change, each country should establish a standing commission 
on labor markets and immigration to facilitate the ﬂ   exible adjustment of 
immigration policy to changing conditions. The standing commission should 
make recommendations to the government every two years.
GESolution 3
Redesign low-skill immigration policies through a combination of   
implementable restrictions and feasible border enforcement. Thereby 
channel illegal migration into legal employment.
Workable restrictions on low-skilled immigration and effective border 
enforcement are a political prerequisite for low-skill immigration policies. 
These are meant to ensure that low-skilled migration is redirected into legal 
channels. 
Immigration problems that channel illegal migration into legal employment 
must recognize the reality of labor market needs, ensure that there are sufﬁ  cient 
work permits to meet them, develop efﬁ  cient recruitment methods, introduce 
means for employers to verify the legal status of job applicants and have enough 
workplace enforcement to ensure employer buy-in. Immigrants arrive not only 
because they can enter the country (legally or not), but because they can ﬁ  nd 
jobs. The latter fact has been insufﬁ  ciently addressed by policies.
5. Designing 
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International labor migration increases world output and welfare by using 
available resources more efﬁ  ciently. But the beneﬁ  ts are distributed unevenly 
and the main beneﬁ  ciaries are not necessarily the voters who can inﬂ  uence 
the formulation immigration policies. It is important to attempt to resolve the 
underlying conﬂ  ict of interests between the principal beneﬁ  ciaries – migrants 
themselves and their home countries – and the decision-makers – host country 
natives whose gains from immigration are marginal.
If migration is successful, migrants themselves beneﬁ  t substantially from higher 
wages, and recipients of remittances enjoy higher disposable incomes. Other 
source country households may beneﬁ  t indirectly, for example, through higher 
government spending ﬁ  nanced from higher tax revenue on growing ﬁ  nancial 
ﬂ  ows. On the downside, skilled emigration might, but need not necessarily, 
lead to a brain drain that impedes economic development.
The beneﬁ  ts of immigration to host country natives is less clear. National income 
will increase, but the additional income will be earned mostly by the migrants 
themselves. Net beneﬁ  ts are likely if immigrants possess scarce skills that are 
complementary to natives´ skills or perform work that natives are unwilling or 
unable to do. At the same time, if immigrants compete with particular groups 
of natives in the labor market, the relative incomes of these latter groups may 
suffer.
GESolution 5
Give irregular immigrants the opportunity and incentives to integrate 
through continuous “earned regularization” leading to naturalization.
Even with tighter controls and more deportations, developed countries will 
continue to be confronted with a substantial inﬂ  ow and the resulting stock 
of irregular immigrants, most of whom are there to stay. The denial of this 
fact risks the accumulation of a massive integration problem just like the 
denial that the “guest workers” were there to stay. To address this problem, 
earned regularization programs leading to opportunities for naturalization of 
those irregular migrants who rapidly acquire language skills and display other 
characteristics conducive to labor market success and rapid integration are 
preferable both to the haphazard mass regularizations that have repeatedly 
occurred in some EU countries and to unrealistic and ultimately irresponsible 
political declarations about mass removals.
This would involve introducing additional conditions over and above those that 
need to be met by immigrants arriving through legal channels.
It is worth acknowledging that irregular immigrants have often jumped the 
queue ahead of those who were following the rules. Thus such immigrants 
need to satisfy additional conditions before being regularized, including the 
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Since immigration policies are decided by elected politicians, viable reforms 
need to win majority political support among host country voters. How does 
this limit policy-makers´ options? Are positive net gains to natives, combined 
with the absence of signiﬁ  cant income losses for any organized social group, a 
necessary political condition for reform?
Although these requirements appear plausible, they may be too stringent. 
There are examples of policies without short-term beneﬁ  ts to native voters that 
are nevertheless tolerated. Much current immigration is based on legal (often 
constitutional) rights of family uniﬁ  cation and attracts low-skilled individuals 
who will face foreseeable difﬁ  culties integrating into the host country labor 
market and society. Similarly, aid to poor countries may not be universally 
popular among donor country voters, but nevertheless it happens.
To bring the beneﬁ  ts to migrants and home countries into the host country 
policy-maker´s calculus, could forward-looking policy-makers argue for 
greater coherence between immigration policy and foreign policy, including 
aid? Arguably, remittances by migrant workers are more effective, globally, in 
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In dealing with terrorism, place emphasis on the state´s capacity to 
protect the public, permit the exercise of its freedoms, and maintain 
public services.
Revolutionary groups that use terrorist tactics seek to undermine the legitimacy 
of the governments they oppose, as a prelude to their overthrow. Terrorist 
attacks are intended to show that the government cannot protect the citizens, 
and that the victory of the revolutionaries is inevitable. As these attacks are 
directed at public infrastructure and take their toll on innocent victims, the 
terrorists come to be feared by many.
For revolutionary terrorist groups to succeed, however, governments must fail. 
In modern society, governments are expected to exercise a monopoly of violence 
allowing them to maintain public order, deliver public goods and enable the 
exercise of individual and communal freedoms. The aim of the terrorist group 
is to prevent this. 
1
1. Dealing with 
 Terrorism
Challenge
The manifestations of terrorism are as diverse as its causes. Some terrorist 
movements are rooted in nationalistic attempts to gain independence, while 
others are founded in religious fundamentalism. Still others seek to destroy 
political and economic systems of governance to overcome “imperialism” and 
exploitation of one social group (or culture) by another.
Terrorist groups either reject the option of seeking integration into the society in 
which they live or have concluded that this option is denied them. These groups 
develop codes of social conduct that are often in conﬂ  ict with established 
social structures. This makes terrorist groups internally coherent and difﬁ  cult to 
penetrate and disrupt. But the success of terrorist groups depends signiﬁ  cantly 
on their being embedded in society. 
Although effective intelligence-sharing and global policy coordination is needed 
to prevent and to minimize the damage to our societies from terrorist attacks, 
a strategy that focuses only on combating terrorist groups and fails to address 
society´s perceptions of their motivation and legitimacy and of the anti-terror 
policies undertaken by the governments is bound to fail. Just as terrorists rely 
on the support of the communities in which they operate and from which 










Govern through inclusive, legitimized political institutions, avoiding 
instrumental justiﬁ  cation of violence.
If we are to persuade others to repudiate terrorism as a tactic, we must 
demonstrate ﬁ  rst, that it is unnecessary, and second, that it is morally reprehensible 
and legally criminal. To achieve agreement on the second principle, we must act 
consistently on the ﬁ  rst, ensuring that our actions match our rhetoric.
Ethnic, racial or religious diversity does not necessarily cause conﬂ  ict. Claims 
by individuals and groups to political access and economic opportunity can be 
pursued through political institutions and mediated by civil society. When sharp 
political or economic disparities cause acute social uncertainty, when the political 
system is exclusive and civil society institutions fail, however, these cleavages 
can become major fault-lines and invite violence.
We must ensure and encourage the emergence and maintenance of inclusive, 
well-functioning political institutions. If we succeed in this, the instrumental 
justiﬁ  cation for violent insurrection falls away, and it is easier to promote a 
moral and normative consensus proscribing it.
Terrorist attacks must be classiﬁ  ed as reprehensible criminal acts, not acts of war. 
People who employ violence against civilians to induce terror, are criminals, not 
a special class of military combatants. They should be prosecuted as criminals 
under the criminal justice system, just as we prosecute leaders of organized 
crime syndicates who employ violence as a tactic.
1
GESolution 2
If the government succeeds in protecting the public and maintaining 
public services, then publicize the impact of terrorist violence on innocent 
civilians, in order to weaken the legitimacy of terrorist groups. At the 
same time, avoid overreaction.
By using this tactic in the 1970s, European governments progressively isolated 
German and Italian terrorists from those who might have supported them 
ideologically, and these groups were eventually defeated. As security has been 
restored in Iraqi neighborhoods and some public services provided, communities 
have begun to oppose al-Qa´ida´s tactics and its violent attacks on civilians 
have become counterproductive. Many reports on acts of terrorism at present, 
however, focus on the impact they have had on the targets chosen by the 
terrorist groups. This builds credibility for the revolutionaries by publicizing their 
objectives and the results they are achieving.
Public perceptions of the risk that jihadist terrorism poses to societies in the 
West overestimate the present danger because few grasp the asymmetry in 
the capacities of al-Qa´ida and Western counterterrorism agencies. Meanwhile, 
statements that Western societies are at “war with terror” strengthen terrorist 
groups rather than weakening them. They reward al-Qa´ida in particular by 
building its reputation. The main risk to Western society at this point is not the 
harm that terrorists can inﬂ  ict, but the harm that we may do to the values that 
deﬁ  ne us, by over-reacting. What “over-reacting” means depends on a society´s 
underlying values. Any reaction that implies a clear breach of these values can 
be considered an over-reaction.











Strengthen our ability to manage the ﬁ  nancial risks of terrorism through 
a combination of public and private instruments: terrorism catastrophe 
bonds, mutual insurance pools, and government insurance support. 
A more sophisticated allocation of roles between private and public sectors will 
help mitigate the ﬁ  nancial effects of major terrorist events. Different approaches 
will be appropriate for different situations. But all should include self-insurance of 
a large part of the risk; reducing insurers´ and reinsurers´ costs of holding capital 
to strengthen their capacity to insure losses; dispersal of the risk through the 
use of terrorism catastrophe bonds; and mutual insurance pools in combination 
with government backstops.
We must maintain the democratic principles and the rule of law on which our 
societies are founded. Sacriﬁ  cing these principles on tactical grounds is dangerous 
and strategically counterproductive. We will not convince communities with 
sympathy for al-Qa´ida that we are acting morally if we abandon the fundamental 
principles that deﬁ  ne our societies. 
GESolution 4
Initiate a comprehensive international initiative to prevent weapons of 
mass destruction falling into terrorist hands.
The one exception to the proposition that Western societies overestimate the risk 
of jihadist terrorism at present, is the risk that diffusion of scientiﬁ  c knowledge 
and technologies may enable terrorist groups to deploy nuclear or biological 
weapons. The use of such weapons could cause unprecedented devastation 
and threaten international cooperation and global growth. All efforts must 
therefore be made to minimize this risk and international cooperation should 
be further strengthened to achieve this (see “Securing Access to Energy”). As a 
ﬁ  rst step this could involve initiating an explicit club of nations with this aim, 
prioritizing the various weapons of mass destruction, taking into account the 
weapons that are paticularly susceptible to terrorists use.










“war on terror.” This strengthens terrorist groups, rather than weakening them. 
More sophisticated strategies, counterinsurgency tactics and communication 
are needed. 
Systemic conditions in their societies have made some Muslims susceptible to 
these messages. The reasons differ from one region to another – Muslims in 
Europe, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia and Afghanistan are not all similarly motivated 
– but many who identify with jihadist causes experience alienation from their 
secular environments and a sense of hopelessness, and are attracted by the 
prospect of glory and religious salvation. Prospects for young, poorly educated 
Afghans, Syrians or Palestinians in the occupied territories have been poor in 
past decades, and anger and intense frustration can be channeled into radical 
utopian causes if life holds no promise.
Social and economic development of these communities will create opportunities 
and reduce the pool of potential recruits. At the same time, many European 
countries need urgently to develop strategies to integrate their Muslim 
immigrants more effectively into viable pluralistic societies. 
GESolution 6
Avoid policies and pronouncements that feed grievance. In pluralistic 
societies, pursue policies that integrate immigrants, rather than just 
providing passive welfare support. 
Terrorist groups are only successful if they enjoy sympathy for their causes. 
Sympathizers perceive the injustice that such groups claim as justifying their 
struggle as real and demanding a response. Claims by al-Qa´ida that Muslims 
have an obligation to rise in a defensive jihad against Western political, economic 
and social dominance, and corrupt, irreligious Western mores. Broadcasts 
and websites couch the call in terms that require devout Muslims to respond, 
claiming that Islam, Muslims and Islamic lands are under attack by the U.S. and 
its allies. Jihad is said to be imperative “to repulse tyranny and restore justice 
and rights.” The West needs to reﬂ  ect on its own pronouncements and policy to 
ensure that it does not inadvertently feed these distorted claims. 
Some actions taken in Iraq and Afghanistan and more recently in Pakistan 
and Syria have led those trapped in the crossﬁ   re between insurgents and 
counterterrorist forces to believe that the suffering of innocent victims 
is seen as mere collateral damage, justiﬁ   ed by the West´s concept of a











Terrorism is as old as human history. But the globalization of terrorism is a 
recent phenomenon. Many governments are at a loss as to how to combat it. 
Despite massive counterterrorist activities, terrorist attacks in weak states such 
as Afghanistan and Iraq have continued and the threat of occasional attacks in 
developed countries remains high.
But the public perception of the threat of jihadist terrorism to Western societies 
seems to overstate the real damage it has caused in the Western world while 
understating the damage suffered in developing countries. After 9/11, there 
were only two signiﬁ  cant jihadist attacks in the West: those in Madrid in 2004 
and London in 2005. Many plots were uncovered and foiled, inter alia in 
Canada, Germany and the U.K., all of which reﬂ  ected excellent intelligence and 
police work. 
But the number of Muslim victims of terrorism rose sharply in Afghanistan, 
Iraq, Pakistan and elsewhere in the Muslim world, without governments being 
toppled. As a consequence, al-Qa´ida has lost support. Public opinion has 
turned: opinion polls in Afghanistan and Iraq show that large majorities are 
opposed to the “slaughter of the innocent.”
GESolution 7
Initiate a regional security regime for all the states of the Gulf and the 
Levant, aimed at mutual diplomatic recognition, gradual withdrawal of 
foreign forces, and nuclear nonproliferation. 
The conﬂ  icts in Afghanistan, Iraq, Israel-Palestine, Lebanon, Syria and Iran are 
now entwined. The Quartet responsible for the Middle East peace process 
(comprising the US, the EU, Russia and the United Nations) should prompt the 
states of the region to initiate a regional security regime, incorporating all the 
states of the Gulf and the Levant, and eventually extending to Afghanistan. This 
should address:
￿ A comprehensive peace between Israel and all Arab states, premised 
  on the birth of a politically and economically viable Palestinian state, 
  recognition by all parties of Lebanon´s independence and territorial 
  integrity, and diplomatic recognition of the state of Israel by all Arab 
 states.
￿ Stabilization of the situation in Iraq to allow for the withdrawal of 
  the occupation forces and the transfer of full power and authority to 
  a government representing all Iraqis.
￿ Averting a nuclear arms race in the region and moving towards the 
  goal of a nuclear free, broader Middle East.
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Panelists Qualiﬁ  cations 
One panelist argues that terrorism is not caused by political or social distress or 
by economic grievances. Instead, terrorists are ﬁ  ghting for public recognition 
and their best reward is media attention. He suggests that the grievances 
alleged by terrorist groups as justiﬁ  cation for their activities are simply successful 
marketing strategies that achieve extraordinary levels of recognition for some 
terrorist groups. The solution is to deny them this recognition.
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Create good governance by strengthening peer review, establishing 
international agreements on state and business transparency, and 
monitoring through the recipients of aid.
Good governance is crucial for all aspects of development. Bad governance, 
corruption and rent-seeking are still widespread and lie at the core of the 
development failure of some countries. Creating a vigilant civil society is 
an essential step to hold governments in the world´s poor countries more 
accountable, as the ﬁ  ght against bad governance must be initiated jointly by 
local governments and civil society.
The African peer review mechanism, a voluntary self-monitoring initiative 
by several African countries, is a promising example of a people-centered 
initiative. To manage the peer review and inculcate the spirit of accountability, 
private thinktanks should be set up to gather information from government 
and civil society. In addition, international agreements on state and business 
transparency are required to hold all involved accountable.
In a similar vein, if aid is to be effective, those to whom aid is given should 
be doing the monitoring. Aid presently goes directly to government, which 
becomes the player and referee in its own match. This needs to change by 
empowering civil society to have a far more critical role in the monitoring of 
how aid is allocated and spent.
2 Challenge
Roughly a ﬁ  fth of the developing world´s population lives on less than $1 a day. 
Most of these people live in countries with large inﬂ  ows of aid and sometimes 
even larger revenues from natural resources. Yet poor governance structures 
have prevented effective use of these funds. Dealing with these problems 
involves a combination of a variety of strategies involving local governments, 
civil society, the private sector and the international community.
What are the largest obstacles to development and how can they be tackled? 
What are the most effective ways to “make poverty history?” How can 
governments be transformed to be held more accountable? How should public 
services be provided? What combination of development strategies is required 
to make a decisive step in reducing global poverty?
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In countries with low governance standards, handle public services 
through an independent service authority, jointly managed by 
government authorities, civil society and donors. 
In countries with low administrative capacities and bad governance, the provision 
of public services should not exclusively be done through public agencies. It is 
important that revenues from taxes, commodities and aid are spent effectively, 
but a system modeled on institiutions in developed countries may not work. 
Rather, planning, allocation and delivery of public services should be handled by 
an independent service authority. Such an authority would be jointly managed 
by government authorities, civil society and donors, selecting the best provider 
of basic services from public and private companies, NGOs and churches.
2 GESolution 2
Scrutinize and monitor the spending of commodity revenue with the 
aim of promoting transparency and accountability.
For many developing countries, commodity revenues are a much bigger income 
source than aid. Currently, these revenues lie solely in the hands of governments. 
This makes the creation of good governance and the inclusion of civil society 
even more urgent and important. Only then can countries and their societies 
take full advantage of the commodity boom.
The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, introduced by Transparency 
International, could be used as a model for other industries and countries. The 
aim is to promote transparency, accountability, good governance and sustainable 
economic growth. Through the initiative, the use of funds earned from oil and 
natural resources are monitored and scrutinized.
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Empowering the world´s poor countries requires a combination of 
self-help and external help. To beneﬁ  t maximally from income sources such 
as commodity and tax revenues and foreign aid, good governance is crucial. 
Accountability is the key factor of good governance when it comes to spending 
these funds wisely. By empowering civil society and fostering bottom-up 
accountability to citizens, decision-makers face better incentives to act in 
accordance with the needs of citizens and businesses. Information ﬂ  ows from 
the bottom to the top enable governments to allocate scarce resources better 
and come up with innovative solutions.
Another important aspect of empowerment is integration into the international 
trading system. International trade has been identiﬁ  ed as a deep causal factor 
of economic growth. In some of the world´s poor countries, domestic demand 
alone cannot spur sustainable economic growth. It is therefore essential to 
integrate these economies into the world economy.
2 GESolution 4
Invest in connectivity by creating a global marketplace for trade in tasks, 
along the lines of Ebay.
Poor countries can beneﬁ  t from the global economy through offshoring and 
should not base their development on internal growth. But small ﬁ  rms in small 
countries do not know about opportunities from abroad and the rest of the 
world does not know about these ﬁ  rms.
A centralized global market place similar to Ebay could be created to facilitate 
trade in tasks. To this end, investment in internet connectivity is essential, so 
that small and medium-sized enterprises have a lifeline with businesses abroad 
to trade and invest.
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3. Fighting Corruption    










Empower civil society – at the global, national and local level –
to build coalitions against corruption. Use a holistic approach to ﬁ  ghting 
corruption, including an integrity system with elements such as whistle-
blower protection and exit opportunities for offenders. 
Coalitions between government, private enterprise and civil society organizations 
are required. Solutions have to come from inside countries by empowering 
civil society, by creating an anti-corruption culture and by creating governance 
structures that work.
A holistic approach to ﬁ  ghting corruption requires not only criminal sanctions 
but other elements of an “integrity system.” The most effective elements of a 
concrete integrity system will have to be tailored to the needs and opportunities 
of the society it is designed to protect. They may include whistle-blower 








Poorer countries tend to be measurably more corrupt than richer countries. But 
the debate about causality is still open. Is corruption the single most important 
reason why many sensible reforms essential for economic development fail 
in developing economies, or does economic development raise demand for 
ﬁ  ghting corruption?
At a given level of development, what are the costs of corruption and the most 
promising means of removing corruption from institutions – in government 
administration, security forces and business? Does encouraging whistle-blowing 
produce desired outcomes? How can exit opportunities be provided for petty 
offenders? Are fostering transparency, advising citizens on how to make 
complaints and establishing institutions to handle the resulting cases promising 
solutions in practice? Are monetary incentives effective? Does cultural heritage 
render attempts to improve governance a futile effort? Is ethical training 










Gain experience in measuring the costs of corruption at the micro level. 
Deﬁ  ne good practice by improved indicators of corruption.
We need international support to create experiments to gather data to study 
the causes and consequences of corruption. To measure the costs of corruption 
and to deﬁ  ne meaningful ways to make institutions less corrupt, it is essential to 
know, ﬁ  rst, how corrupt buyers and sellers match, second, how they make and 
enforce their implicit contracts, third, what footprints their illicit transactions 
create, and fourth, what steps they take to cover them up.
Raising consciousness about the existence and harm from corruption is an 
essential precondition for ﬁ  ghting corruption. Indicators that allow countries to 
know where they stand in international comparisons have to be improved on a 
permanent basis. This information should be disseminated on a broad basis.
3
GESolution 2
Stop global companies from bribing decision-makers in developing 
countries.
To avoid getting compromised morally, external organizations have to prove 
that they ﬁ  ght corruption themselves – that is, in their own countries and with 
respect to their own enterprises acting in developing countries.
3. Fighting 











Do not restrict the ﬁ  ght against corruption to prosecution of senior 
ofﬁ  cials involved in graft; instead ﬁ  ght corruption at all relevant levels. 
Deal with corruption politically and head-on, rather than through the 
ﬁ  nance of political competition.
Making the “frying of big ﬁ  sh“ the ultimate measure of success in the ﬁ  ght 
against corruption strategically sets up the campaign to fail from the start. The 
prosecution of senior ofﬁ  cials (especially top politicians) involved in graft has been 
rare even in developed democracies and, when achieved, it is at considerable 
political costs, which are mitigated by mature governance institutions. For 
Africa, we need to set new benchmarks of what success looks like in the ﬁ  ght 
against corruption.
Mobilization of resources to ﬁ  nance political competition has proved problematic 
and has had the effect of corrupting important political processes. Political 
campaign ﬁ   nance is a challenge even in mature democracies. In nascent 
democracies, it can become a crisis because sometimes egregious corruption 
ﬁ  nances politics. We need to address this head on – politically ﬁ  rst.
3
GESolution 4
Use checks and balances within government to ﬁ  ght  systemic 
corruption.
The potential of transparency and deﬁ  ning good practice will not be sufﬁ  cient 
for cases where corruption is systemic (where corruption has become the norm, 
so that political will cannot be counted on). In this case, potential drivers of anti-
corruption policies have to be detected and supported.
A public counterpart – a congressional committee, a supreme audit authority, 
independent government agencies – can act as a catalyst. Even within an initially 
corrupted agency, good knowledge about the costs of corruption, improved 
transparency on the level of corruption, information on good practice, and 
support for bottom-up demand could create a dynamic public debate for less 
corruption.
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Although knowledge and transparency may be incomplete, this is no excuse 
for not acting on corruption where it clearly leads to welfare losses. But in 
cases where corruption is systematic and has become the norm, political will 
to implement solutions cannot be counted on. In this case, potential drivers of 
anti-corruption policies have to be detected and supported.
The list of potential participants for each of these stages is long: citizens´ groups, 
the press, religious groups, business groups beneﬁ  ting from anti-corruption 
measures, and international organizations. While this can be thought to 
strengthen bottom-up demand for less corrupt institutions from the private 
sector, a public counterpart can act as a catalyst.
External incentives (such as conditionality and penalties) are uncertain if not 
unlikely to help. Solutions have to come from inside countries by empowering 




Corruption – the misuse of ofﬁ  ce for private gain – covers a wide array of illicit 
behaviors, including bribery, extortion, fraud, nepotism, graft, speed money, 
embezzlement, falsiﬁ   cation of records, kickbacks and inﬂ  uence-peddling. 
Hence, researchers still encounter difﬁ  culties in estimating the costs of this 
phenomenon at the micro level. Creating experiments to gather data to study 
the causes and consequences of corruption is an area in which one can make a 
plausible call for action.
Raising consciousness about the existence and harms of corruption is an 
essential precondition for ﬁ  ghting corruption. Indicators that allow countries 
to know where they stand in international comparison have to be improved on 
a permanent basis. In combination with complementary information on other 
bottlenecks of economic development, good knowledge about corruption 
should stimulate and guide public debate.
In addition to quantitative information, good news should be spread. For even 
the most daunting problems, relative progress exists and success stories can 
be found. This information should be disseminated on a broad basis to break 
skepticism about potential reform efforts. 
3. Fighting 
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Do not help the losers from globalization by protecting speciﬁ  c jobs or 
industries. Instead, use hiring and training vouchers to subsidize hiring 
or retraining of workers within ﬁ  rms.
Some workers may lose their jobs because of globalization, as their sector 
shrinks or is closed down. This process is necessary to guarantee an efﬁ  cient 
allocation of resources.
Hiring and training vouchers provide incentives for ﬁ  rms to hire and retrain less 
productive or unemployed workers. This avoids the erosion of workers´ skills; 
indeed, they acquire knowledge and improve their productivity. Training within 
a ﬁ  rm also strengthens the probability of a long-term relationship between 
worker and ﬁ  rm following the training program.
The potential success of this policy lies in the administrative details. Retraining 
is already offered by many government agencies, and this may lead to a high 
degree of misalignment and political economy problems.
4
4. How Globalization  
 Transforms  the 
 Welfare  State
Challenge
What are the implications for welfare state reform? What constellation of 
welfare state policies enables us to compensate the losers from globalization 
without harming incentives to work and acquire skills? What are the appropriate 
roles of the state, ﬁ  rms, housholds and civic organizations in the provision of 
welfare services? The current phase of globalization along with the associated 
technological advances has led to the geographic decomposition of businesses´ 
value chain and far-reaching changes in the organization of production and 
work. These changes, along with other demographic and social changes, have 
called the effectiveness of the traditional welfare state into question. New 
demands are made of welfare services and new segments of the population 










Make increased use of value-added taxes, property taxes and carbon 
taxes to  ﬁ  nance the welfare state without giving incentives for a brain 
drain of high-income workers.




Encourage research to clarify the attributes of efﬁ  cient and active labor 
market policies, including “individual welfare accounts.” 
It is widely accepted that active labor market policies have a role in fostering labor 
market ﬂ  exibility. But hitherto these policies have not been very well conceived 
or properly designed and have failed to achieve the necessary ﬂ  exibility. Efforts to 
develop better designs for active labor market policies are worth promoting.
Like hiring and training vouchers, individual welfare accounts constitutes another 
policy that appears promising, though further evidence is needed to ﬁ  nd the 
appropriate design. Again, the potential for success lies in the administrative 
details, which have to be set out very carefully. Personal accounts have been 
tested reasonably successfully in Austria, Malaysia and Singapore.
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On retirement, positive balances on the unemployment and skill accounts could 
be transferred to the retirement account. People with negative account balances 
on retirement would receive no refund and pay no penalty.
To reduce inequality, the accounts of the rich could be taxed and the accounts 
of the poor could be subsidized. The increased mobility of individuals across 
countries increases the usefulness of international portability” of welfare-state 
entitlements, especially pensions and health care. In addition to current EU 
efforts to increase such portability, increased reliance on individual welfare 
accounts would be helpful.
4
Background
Hiring and training vouchers targeted at the long-term unemployed and the 
unskilled unemployed can promote people´s “employability”, both by helping 
them become integrated into the workforce and enhancing their skills through 
“learning-by-doing”. The provision of good quality education is important to 
enable people to seize new job opportunities more effectively in a changing 
economic environment. This policy may also enable those who are most hurt by 
globalization to ﬁ  nd alternative employment opportunities through their own 
efforts.
Welfare accounts with redistributional provisions can improve people´s 
adaptability, enabling the losers from globalization to turn themselves into 
winners. This process can be expedited through “individual welfare accounts”: 
speciﬁ  cally an unemployment account (covering unemployment support), a skill 
account (covering public post-school education and training) and a retirement 
account (covering state pensions).
When people become unemployed, they would make withdrawals from their 
unemployment account instead of receiving unemployment beneﬁ  ts;  when 
they acquire skills, withdrawals from their skill account would substitute for 
current government expenditures on post-school education and training; and 
when they retire, withdrawals from their retirement account would substitute 
for their current state pensions.
4. How Globalization  
 Transforms  the 









Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs, European Commission
Assar Lindbeck
Professor of International Economics,
University of Stockholm
Belmiro De Azevedo
Chairman, Sonae Group; 
Chairman, Sonae Indústrias; 
Chairman and CEO, Sonae Capital
Peter S. Heller
Professor of Economics, 
Johns Hopkins University
Adam Posen
Deputy Director, Peterson Institute
Moderator: Evan Davis




The central disagreement concerns the need for compensating transfers to 
be made to those groups that lose when globalization undermines their value 
or destroys their jobs. Some panelists feel that the right response is to ﬁ  nd 
ways of protecting people from losses. Others feel that this undermines the 
beneﬁ  ts of globalization and diminishes incentives to be ﬂ  exible in response to 
competition.
For the latter view, there is nevertheless recognition that there needs to be a 
basic social safety net mechanism, one that includes a combination of a means-
tested welfare and vigorous efforts in job retraining and placement to limit 
support for protectionist policies. 
4. How Globalization  
 Transforms  the 









5. Reconsidering the 
 International 









Focus the international trading system on the core task of facilitating 
market access in industrial goods, services and agriculture through 
lowering border barriers.
This can be done through a combination of traditional reciprocal concessions, 
long transition periods to alleviate adjustment and compensation measures, 
if necessary ﬁ   nancial compensation. Simplifying the negotiating agenda by 
including only issues directly related to trade in goods and services – possibly 
focusing only on market access issues to start with – might be one way to 
facilitate negotiations. A step-by-step approach could be considered, since 




The international trading system faces three interconnected 
developments: increasing heterogeneity of its more than 150 members; 
conﬂ   icting targets between non-discrimination and distributional 
fairness; and the inability to conclude agreements.
It is important to restore the reputation of the international trading system as the 
only global regulatory order that defends non-discrimination and less powerful 
member states against the pressure of vested interest groups and more powerful 
member states. How can the system be brought back onto its past successful 
track? How can the system be strengthened against emerging threats of 
protectionism? What is the right balance between regionalism and 
multilateralism? 
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Furthermore, national cost-beneﬁ  t tests should be extended to safeguard mea-
sures and should explicitly measure and consider the losses of private househol-
ds and buyers of intermediates that would be incurred because of contingent 
protection measures.
GESolution 4
Sharpen the WTO´s dispute settlement mechanism through introducing 
options of cash compensation and rights of class actions.
The dispute settlement mechanism (DSM) has become an important asset of 
the WTO. But the party who is entitled to retaliate often suffers from deliberate 
delay strategies of the party who was found violating rules. This can be changed 
by options of cash compensation to aggrieved member states where compliance 
with DSM decisions is found unjustiﬁ  ably delayed and by introducing rights of 
class actions (groups of countries can invoke the DSM). 
5
GESolution   2
Contain the mushrooming of regional and bilateral trade agreements 
by stricter rules for compliance with non-discrimination principles.
Free trade agreements should have a uniform percentage value added rule of 
origin while also having a clause enabling any other country willing to accept 
the terms of the agreement to join. 
GESolution 3
Raise the thresholds required for implementing contingent protectionist 
measures (such as safeguard measures, dumping and subsidies), as well 
as quantifying the costs to consumers (for example, through a public 
beneﬁ  t clause).
Contingent protection measures have become a major battleﬁ  eld of protectionist 
interventions and create much damage to traders. Given the rapid growth in 
world trade and the rise of market penetration through imports (including trade 
in intermediates) in recent years, it is appropriate to raise the level of incurred 
damage to local producers through imports that are seen as “negligible.”
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 the  International 
 Trading  System 
Background
The multilateral trading system faces considerable challenges in dealing with the 
issues of 153 members with diverse interests. But in these uncertain times, the 
multilateral system´s rules and disciplines offer a needed sense of stability and 
predictability. Against this background, the merits of 60 years of multilateralism 
cannot be taken for granted; rather, multilateralism should be given the priority 
it deserves and policy-makers should endeavor to build on and improve the 
system.
This is why solutions leading out of the current highly unsatisfactory situation 
of the system must not address technicalities but fundamentals. This means 
more focus on essential issues of negotiations, more discipline against the ﬂ  ood 
of exceptions from most-favored nation treatment, containment of “grey area” 
measures, which raise transaction costs and risk premia for both exporters and 
importers and, ﬁ  nally, improving the authority of the WTO as the protector of 
the weaker partners against the abuse of economic power through dispute 
settlement.
The common thrust of the solutions is not necessarily for further liberalization, 
but for discipline, non-discrimination and transparency.Content
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GESolution   1
In the medium run, establish a global price of carbon, reﬂ  ecting the 
environmental cost.
It is very important to move rapidly towards policies that induce decision-makers 
to pay the appropriate global price of carbon. This can be done through a 
carbon tax or a system of tradable permits, with revenues preferably used for 
climate protection. The price should apply to all emissions.
A wide variety of policy instruments are currently used to reduce emissions, 
including quantitative restrictions, biofuel targets, technological speciﬁ  cations 
and voluntary restraints. This solution implies that whenever such instruments 
fail to induce decision-makers to pay the appropriate global price of carbon, they 
are questionable and, at best, only stepping stones towards a better policy.
Challenge
Dealing with climate change requires global cooperation since the social costs 
of greenhouse gas emissions are independent of where the emissions occur. It is 
difﬁ  cult to achieve broad participation in a global cooperative initiative to reduce 
emissions because of large economic and environmental asymmetries among 
world regions and the incentives to freeride in environmental negotiations.
How can the people of the world be induced to take account of the costs of their 
emissions? How can they best be encouraged to control their emissions and adapt 
to climate change? How can incentives for technological innovation and diffusion 
be created? How should the costs of policy collaboration be distributed among
developing and developed countries? 
1. Global Policy 
 Responses  to 













GESolution   3
Give developing countries support in adaptation and adoption of best 
practice technologies.
A system with emission rights that converges towards equal per capita emissions 
would give substantial leeway for emissions to the developing countries. It 
would also incorporate a substantial ﬁ   nancial transfer from the developed 
countries to the developing countries. Emissions from industrial production 
must be allocated to the place where the products are used. 
It has been suggested that the developed countries should create a sufﬁ  ciently 
large global fund to help developing countries meet their obligations. If this 
course were pursued, it would be necessary to ensure that efﬁ  cient criteria 
for allocating funds were agreed in advance to avoid the dangers of needless 
bureaucracy and misuse of funds. The EU´s Joint Implementation and the Clean 
Development Mechanism are a cost-efﬁ   cient way to reduce emissions and 
encourage technology transfer and cooperation in a market-oriented context.
1
GESolution 2
In the short run, include all countries responsible for substantial 
greenhouse gas emissions in an international agreement to reduce them; 
then make steady progress towards a globally inclusive agreement.
The core group must encompass at least 10-20 countries, including the 
European Union (EU), the U.S. and all the non-OECD countries responsible for 
major emissions, such as Brazil, China, India and Russia. 
Developing countries do not currently face binding targets for emissions 
reductions. But for equity reasons, participation by non-OECD countries should 
not necessarily require large emission reductions in these countries, at least for 
the next decade. Alternatively, these countries could receive ﬁ  nancial help in 
meeting their target commitments.
Policies must lead to an actual reduction of emissions globally at any time 
during the process. They must not induce relocation of industrial production 
from participating countries with modern, efﬁ  cient production plants to non-
participating countries with less efﬁ  cient production.
Policies must not disadvantage producers in participating countries 
that use state-of-the-art production technology vis-à-vis producers in 
non-participating countries or laggard producers in participating countries that 
use less efﬁ  cient production technologies. 
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The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, agreed in 
1992, lies at the heart of global efforts to prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system. Much better known is the principal 
update, the Kyoto Protocol, which was agreed in 1997 and which introduced 
mandatory emission limits for the ﬁ  rst time. 
Countries´ obligations under the Kyoto Protocol remain far behind the necessary 
actions to prevent climate change. The agreement only mandates minor 
reductions in emissions by the developed countries; the U.S. did not sign it; 
and fast developing economies like China and India do not face binding caps. 
More effective climate regimes must be developed for the post-Kyoto era after 
2012.
A future international climate policy system must be both efﬁ  cient (not wasteful) 
and equitable (fair). Efﬁ  ciency implies meeting given environmental targets at 




Support research and development and eliminate barriers to technology 
transfer.
Policies that encourage the development and deployment of innovative 
technologies should be implemented. Barriers to technology transfer should be 
removed. And replication of environmentally friendly technologies should be 
encouraged, for example, through domestic R&D policies. 
There are currently large barriers to efﬁ  cient technology transfer. For example, 
intellectual property rights are missing in many developing countries, and there 
are high investment risks and transaction costs in developed countries. 
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In the long run, every emitter must pay the same cost for each ton of greenhouse 
gas emissions. This requirement is necessary for efﬁ  ciency reasons, for the simple 
reason that every ton of emissions has the same social cost, regardless of where 
the emissions occur. 
Satisfying the efﬁ  ciency requirement implies the long-run goal of a truly global 
agreement, with equal costs of equal emissions. The agreement must be 
inclusive in terms of countries (including developed and developing countries) 
and sectors (including agriculture, industry and services).
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Increase the efﬁ   ciency of bio-energy production in poor countries 
by switching from traditional bio-energy use to modern bio-energy 
sources, thereby releasing more land for food production and providing 
inexpensive sources of electricity and from transport for economic 
development.
 
The potential for productivity improvements in food production outside the 
developed countries is huge. But there is a dilemma. The investment necessary 
for such improvements can only be ﬁ  nanced if stable and sufﬁ  ciently high prices 
make these investments proﬁ  table. Yet high prices are detrimental to the ﬁ  ght 
against hunger unless it is possible to raise the incomes of the poor.
Currently, many poor countries rely to a large degree on traditional bio-
energy services in their overall energy consumption. It is not uncommon that 
in some countries more than 50 and up to 90 percent of the overall energy 
consumption originates from collected fuelwood and other traditional sources 
such agricultural residues. Since in many remote areas modern fossil energy 
is unaffordable due to high prices and unavailable due to a lack of logistics, 
traditional energy is currently the only alternative, although a very inefﬁ  cient 
one in terms of energy services and in terms of land requirements. In fact, land 
is often used in a combination of extensive animal grazing with the collection 
of traditional bio-energy. This requires a large share of the available land and 
leaves little room for food production.
2 Challenge
Partially replacing gasoline and diesel with biofuels requires agricultural products 
that compete with food production for the world´s scarce resources of fertile 
land. A range of factors, including the growing world population and rising 
incomes in emerging economies, have led to the sharp rise in agricultural prices 
over the past few years (recently interrupted by the global ﬁ  nancial crisis but 
not obviated in the longer run). But price rises have also been driven by the 
expansion of biofuels. To some degree therefore, the aim of protecting the 
climate is in conﬂ  ict with the aim of combating hunger. But it also should be 
noted that in some cases, policy support for biofuels appears to have been 
driven more by the demands of special interest groups than by the need to 
preserve the climate.
How can we avoid the conﬂ  ict between food and fuel? What is the right 
balance between food and fuel in the allocation of land? How can the 
burden of higher food prices on people in developing countries be alleviated? 
What is the appropriate role of technology (such as second-generation 
biofuels), taxes and subsidies and government regulation in dealing with this 
problem?














Expand agricultural production on “degraded land” so as to increase the 
supply of food and bioenergy without compromising on biodiversity or 
carbon sinks.
The potential for increasing the area under cultivation conﬂ   icts with the 
preservation of biological resources and conservation of carbon that exists in 
the biomass and soils. These carbon pools could be destabilized through land 
use changes and could further increase greenhouse gas emissions.
But there are signiﬁ  cant areas of what is known as “degraded land”, on which an 
expansion of agricultural production for bio-energy as well as food could take 
place without threatening biodiversity or destabilizing carbon stocks. Especially 
the above mentioned modern farming techniques and the opportunity for 
introducing irrigation due to a better access to energy services could convert so 
far unproductive and “degraded” land into a productive resource.
How many areas would be suitable and what proportions could be used in an 
economically sound way remains uncertain. The identiﬁ  cation of these areas is a 
prerequisite for an expansion of bio-energy production that is not in conﬂ  ict with 
the demands on land for food production and the preservation of biodiversity.
2
A switch from traditional bio-energy use towards modern bio-energy sources 
combined with advanced agricultural farming practices could increase 
bio-energy services signiﬁ   cantly without requiring more land area. Modern 
techniques of bio-energy use rely on modern farming techniques such as 
advanced and less extensive cattle farming or modern tropical agriculture 
that combines food production with the maintenance of a forest cover thus 
both producing food and bio-energy on the same land area. Local distilleries 
for biofuels and more efﬁ  cient appliances for producing heat and electricity 
can provide the opportunity the development of rural areas. Access to fuels 
is prerequisite for the access of rural communities to larger markets. The 
availability of electricity is also helps in improving the knowledge about modern 
farming techniques and the implementation of such techniques. Thus, the 
development of modern bio-energy uses in rural areas has the chance to 
improve agricultural productivity by both making more land available for food 
production and by providing inexpensive sources of electricity and transport 
fuel necessary for the economic development of remote rural areas in many 
parts of the world. 














Ensure that food and biofuel production are allotted their climate 
costs.
Reconsider government interventions in biofuels, and focus instead on the 
emissions reductions they can actually achieve; at the same time, ensure that 
food production is allotted its “climate costs.” Subsidies for biofuels should be 
determined as part of an integrated global policy to control concentrations 
of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. In such a policy, all emissions should 
be treated in the same way, which means that any land use activity – food 
production or bio-energy production – should be subject to the same regulation 
of its emissions. This ﬁ  rst requires a complete greenhouse gas balance of each 
activity, including cases where there are negative emissions because the activity 
increases carbon stocks in the land.
In principle, the cost of biofuels should reﬂ  ect the social cost of the emissions 
they generate plus any other costs and beneﬁ  ts, for example, their impact on 
biodiversity. But this also needs to be done for food and fodder products, which 
have climate effects of similar size to bio-energy production.
2 GESolution 3
For poor countries, support improved access to energy, agricultural 
technology transfer, and improved management of strategic reserves. 
The improvement of supply-side conditions for agricultural production in poor 
areas through the combination of improved agricultural technologies and a 
more efﬁ  cient use of biomass for producing energy services could bring about 
a dynamic push for rural development. This would contribute to eradicating 
hunger and to providing non-fossil energy sources. The stabilization of world 
commodity prices through better management of strategic reserves could also 
improve supply-side conditions for local farmers and prevent the kind of social 
unrest that happened following recent price hikes in grain markets. 














Biofuel production has been responsible for a signiﬁ  cant part of the increase in 
feedstock demand in recent years. More than half of the increase in demand for 
grain and vegetable oil over the period 2005–07 was due to biofuels. Feedstock 
demand from the biofuels sector is potentially a permanent driver of future 
agricultural commodity prices. Projections show that with biofuel production 
kept constant at its 2007 level, wheat prices would be around 6%, maize 
around 12% and vegetable oil prices around 15% lower in 2017 than in the 
baseline projection, which assumes a doubling of biofuel production over the 
next 10 years.
One way out of this potential “food versus fuel” dilemma is the use of abandoned 
agricultural land to grow biomass. The available abandoned land worldwide on 
which biomass could be grown is estimated at 385–472 million hectares, which 
would account for 7–8% of global primary energy demand.
This potential is limited from a global perspective but not from the perspective 
of developing countries, where a large share of primary energy needs is already 
met through traditional biomass. These needs could be met more efﬁ  ciently and 
without additional demand on land by switching to modern biomass grown on 
abandoned or degraded land.
2
Carbon prices (through emissions taxes or a tradable permit system) are good 
instruments for adding the cost of emissions to the market price of biomass (food 
as well as bio-energy). They bring equal conditions to all land use activities but 
they also put the costs of climate protection through bio-energy in perspective 
relative to those of other mitigation activities.
R&D for second-generation biofuels (from cellulosic sources) should be 
supported on an equal basis as for other innovations to reduce emissions (for 
example, solar energy generation, hydrogen fuel cells, and carbon capture and 
sequestration).













3. Biofuel policies around the world serve a double purpose: To increase energy 
security and reduce harmful GHG emissions. As long as the price of carbon 
is kept artiﬁ  cially low the support of biofuel use through government policy 
is the best option for society. 
4. Biofuels substitute fossil fuels. In order to allow accurate calculations of 
the actual GHG emission saving of biofuels a realistic model to assess the 
emission of fossil fuels is crucial. To date we are using a fossil fuel emission 
benchmark provided by the oil industry. The accuracy of this data needs to 
be challenged. A realistic GHG emission model of fossil fuel (not only biofuels 
and food) is thus needed and should include all fossil fuels also the so-called 
unconventional ones. Once this benchmark is established the true emission 
saving of biofuels as well as their social costs/beneﬁ  ts can be assessed.
2 Qualiﬁ  cations
by Robert Vierhout, Secretary General, European Bioethanol Fuel Association
1. There is no causal relationship between increased biofuel production and high 
food prices. The present reality proves this case: Since mid 2008 prices of raw 
materials came down rapidly to the level of early 2007 prices whereas the 
global production of biofuel did further increase. And this development seems 
to be sustainable: Recently released material form the U.S. Congressional 
Budget Ofﬁ  ce (CBO) sees corn prices heading for a decade-long slump below 
US$ 4 per bushel. Corn prices, according to the CBO, are expected to stay 
low even as total use rises by 18% by the end of next decade. This will be 
achieved thanks to yield increase, which is a crucial element when analyzing 
the food and fuel issue. 
2.  Biofuels can be produced without conﬂ   icting with food production or 
biodiversity. Former set aside land could be brought back into production 
as well as abandoned land and land that does release less carbon than can 
be saved by the biofuel. A very important measure is to increase yields, both 
the agricultural yield per hectar as well as the ethanol yield through the 
utilization of straw or corn stover and more efﬁ  cient process technologies. 
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3. Energy versus 














Improve efﬁ  ciency in energy consumption through the use of state-of-
the-art technologies, including improvements in residental homes and 
manufacturing process.
Energy savings reduce emissions independent of the underlying energy source 
and enable economic growth at the same time. Only a fraction of the current 
global energy use would be required to provide the same energy services if the 
best state-of-the art technologies were used. This requires global dissemination 
of information and support for global technology transfers. Straightforward, 
well-established improvements in insulating homes could make a substantial 
contribution to energy efﬁ   ciency and greenhouse gas emission reductions 
worldwide. Large gains could also be achieved through the adoption of 
best-practice technologies in manufacturing industries.
3
3. Energy versus 
 Climate  Change
Challenge
Both economic growth and climate change are associated with increasing 
demand for energy, which at present is mainly met by fossil fuels such as coal, oil 
and gas. Tackling climate change requires immediate reductions in greenhouse 
gas emissions. This means that we face an “energy puzzle” – how energy supply 
and demand can be inﬂ  uenced in a way that both economic growth and the 
prevention of dangerous climate change can be achieved.
What energy intensity and energy mixes are economically efﬁ  cient now and in 
the future in different regions of the world? How can technological progress be 
accelerated and existing technologies brought to the market to reduce the cost 














Aim to “decarbonize” energy supply completely by the end of the 21st 
century through renewable energy and possibly fusion.
The future energy portfolio will be composed completely of renewable energy 
sources and possibly nuclear fusion (if it becomes feasible). The enhanced use of 
biomass together with CCS could even generate negative emissions. 
GESolution 5
Provide support to build large-scale solar power plants.
Solar energy is likely to outperform other renewable energy sources in the long 
run because of its almost unlimited availability. Large-scale solar power plants in 
Africa could already satisfy world energy demand, if storage and transportation 




Provide ﬂ  exible, on-going support for research and development on 
environmentally supportive energy use, through subsidies and bonuses 
for technology development and deployment.
There should be a continuous R&D process dominated by private R&D, including 
public-private partnerships. A combination of subsidies for promising ideas and 
bonuses for successful innovations could encourage new research without 
permanently subsidizing inefﬁ  cient technologies. 
GESolution 3
Support carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) to allow the extended 
use of fossil reserves in the transition phase to a carbon-free energy 
supply.
The world energy portfolio will be dominated by fossil fuels for the next 20 years. 
Using CCS, an increasing share of the resulting emissions could be captured and 
injected into geological formations and submarine sediments.
3. Energy versus 













CCS has huge potential to extend the use of fossil reserves. In the Norwegian 
Sleipner project, carbon dioxide is separated from Sleipner West´s gas production 
and injected into the Utsira sandstone formation (aquifer), rather than released 
into the air. The entire emissions from all the power stations in Europe for 600 
years could be deposited in this structure.
The renewable energy source with the most promising potential is solar 
radiation. The solar energy that arrives each year on 1km2 desert is on average 
2.2 terawatt hours, yielding 80 million terawatt hours/year. This is a factor of 
750 more than the fossil energy consumption of 2005, and there is still a factor 
of 250 if this demand were to triple by 2050. With current knowledge, it is 
possible to convert 15% of solar radiation into electricity. This means that 1% 
of the area of global deserts would be sufﬁ  cient to produce the entire annual 
primary energy consumption of humankind as electrical power. 
The development of CCS and solar energy is capital-intensive and requires 
further R&D. Unfortunately, current trends are not going in that direction. 
Energy-related R&D programs have declined dramatically in the OECD countries 
in the past decade: public investment declined from $12 billion a year to $8 
billion, while private investment declined from $8 billion to $4 billion.
3
Background
Limiting increases in global temperatures to below 2°C requires the reduction of 
worldwide average per capita emissions to 0.3 tons of carbon annually, which 
is equal to India´s current level. Such a cut in the world´s emissions requires 
cumulative investments in energy supply infrastructure of $22 trillion by 2030, 
and an increase in energy R&D relative to GDP from over 0.02% today to about 
0.08% in 2080. These numbers indicate the dimensions of the challenge.
Investment in energy R&D and energy supply infrastructure should focus on three 
major ﬁ  elds: increasing energy efﬁ  ciency; deployment of CCS; and deployment 
of large-scale solar energy projects. 
The residential sector has huge potential for energy savings by efﬁ  ciency gains. 
Existing buildings are responsible for over 40% of the world´s total primary energy 
consumption and 24% of world emissions. About 70% of energy consumption 
is for heating and cooling. There is also potential in the global industrial sector: 
19–32% of emissions reductions could be achieved by adopting best practice 
commercial technologies in manufacturing industries.
3. Energy versus 
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4. Securing Access 














Promote competitive, open and transparent energy markets. Encourage 
international agreements to reduce energy subsidies.   
Such markets are essential to the efﬁ  cient functioning of the global energy 
system and to attracting the necessary investments into a sustainable global 
energy value chain. It is desirable to advance transparency, to deepen and 
spread the rule of law, and to establish and strengthen predictable, efﬁ  cient 
ﬁ  scal and regulatory regimes.
Energy markets need to be made more transparent, particularly in countries 
where fuel price controls make it cheap to buy energy relative to world price 
levels. We should encourage international agreements that seek to reduce these 




 to  Energy
Challenge
Ensuring secure and affordable supplies of energy is a global challenge of 
growing importance. The challenges ahead include the depletion of oil and 
other fossil fuels; the reliance of most countries on foreign energy sources; global 
distributional conﬂ  icts arising from the rapidly growing demand for exhaustible 
fossil fuels; geopolitical conﬂ  icts arising from the political instability of exporter 
countries, from exporters using their market power for political purposes or 
from terrorism funded by petrodollars.
Tackling the challenges of energy security requires a sustained, globally 
integrated policy approach which, on the one hand, takes account of
the political and economic interests of both energy-producing and energy-
consuming countries and, on the other hand, helps to balance the economic, 














Encourage countries to diversify their energy mix, both materially 
and geographically. Clarify the vulnerabilities of the global energy 
network.   
Material diversiﬁ  cation – by more extensive use of renewables and development 
of innovative technologies – will reduce the vulnerability of energy users to 
shocks affecting individual energy sources. Geographical diversiﬁ  cation – by 
importing energy from various countries – will reduce the vulnerability of energy 
users to political instability in individual countries or regions.
In addition to diversifying their energy mix, developed countries should help 
energy-producing countries diversify their economies, making them less 
dependent on high energy prices.
An international effort needs to be initiated to provide better understanding of 
these vulnerabilities and ways to prevent disruptions by terrorist attacks. (See 
also “Dealing with Terrorism”).
4
GESolution 2
Improve energy efﬁ  ciency and energy saving, especially in the transport 
sector. Support an R&D program on energy efﬁ  ciency, ﬁ  nanced from 
national and supranational budgets, including funds from the auctions 
of emission rights. 
Increased energy efﬁ  ciency and conservation reduce stress on infrastructure and 
contribute to a healthier environment through decreased emission of greenhouses 
gases and pollutants. Special attention should be given to the transport sector, 
which is responsible for the majority of world oil consumption.
An R&D program on energy should cover all types of energy technologies (supply 
and demand side) and it should be unbiased with respect to speciﬁ  c technical 
solutions. It should be ﬁ  nanced through national and supranational budgets, 
including funds from the auctions of the EU´s emissions trading scheme. The 
program should not interfere with the proper functioning of the internal market 


















Ensuring secure and affordable supplies of energy requires innovative solutions 
to a variety of current problems. These problems cannot be addressed by a 
“magic bullet,” a single, comprehensive strategy that solves all problems 
simultaneously.
The idea, for example, of supplying most of Europe´s energy needs from 
large solar energy plants in the Sahara is undoubtedly an attractive option 
from an environmental perspective (see “Energy versus climate change”). This 
concentration of energy supply on a single region may, however, run the risk of 
triggering serious economic and political conﬂ  icts between energy producers 
and consumers. It may also meet opposition from people living close to the 
projected lines needed for transporting and distributing the energy within 
Europe. 
What is warranted instead is a permanent and global search for the most 
appropriate mix of solutions for individual problems. This requires balancing all 
available options in a more open-minded and less ideological way, and giving 
all options that emerge a fair chance by constantly and non-discriminatorily 
supporting R&D on new solutions.
It also requires countries to cooperate more extensively, and to accept 
compromises for the beneﬁ  t of internationally coordinated solutions. Ensuring 
secure and affordable supplies of energy is a global challenge that cannot be 
solved effectively if all countries focus on their own backyards.
4
GESolution 4
Give more competences to supranational organizations and institutions, 
such as the International Energy Agency.
Energy security is essentially a global problem and it is often dealt with 
inadequately at national or local levels. For example, the EU is currently entitled 
only to set frameworks for a competitive and integrated energy market: it 
should also have authority on the content of energy policies.
The International Energy Agency – which is currently dominated by OECD 
countries – should be strengthened by bringing in all key consumers and 
producers to give this important institution a greater voice.
4. Securing 
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5. Preventing Food Prices  
  from Creating Poverty  














Scale up social protection programs to target cash and food transfers 
to vulnerable groups over a transition period in the interval before a 
supply-side response can be expected.
Such policy interventions appear to be justiﬁ  ed to prevent even larger future 
welfare losses that are likely to result from a decline in investment in education 
and health. For example, to reduce the devastating long-term effects of 
malnutrition during childhood, especially for girls, nutrition programs such as 
infant and school feeding should be introduced more widely. 
GESolution 2
Recalibrate foreign aid to give higher priority to investment in agriculture 
and social protection.
More aid for agricultural investments, including rural roads, irrigation and 
extension services as well as R&D, will reinforce the supply response of 
smallholders and is a promising way to ﬁ  ght rural poverty.
5
5.  Preventing Food 
 Prices  from 
 Creating  Poverty 
 and  Malnutrition
Challenge
Whereas high food prices are certainly not the main cause of poverty and 
malnutrition in the world, the recent food price surge has caused acute hardship 
and social unrest in many countries. Even in the aftermath of the ﬁ  nancial 
crisis, real food prices remain well above their levels a decade ago and they are 
expected to rise sustantially once the world economy recovers. 
The urban poor, who spend large shares of their income on food but are unable 
to beneﬁ  t from rising food prices, are most adversely affected. Since rising food 
prices command a larger share of a limited budget, the poor are forced to shift 
their expenditures to cheaper diets with less proteins and micronutrients, to 
reduce their expenditures on investment goods like education and health care 
and to compromise on buying insurance against unemployment or on saving 
for retirement. 
As a result, soaring food prices threaten to undo much of the progress developing 
countries have made in ﬁ  ghting chronic malnutrition and persistent poverty over 
the past decade. At the same time, higher food prices boost the incomes of the 
producers of food, providing a unique opportunity for promoting agricultural 
and rural development in many low-income countries.
Which policies are needed to help the most vulnerable people in the short run 
and to increase agricultural production in the long run? Which measures can 
maximize the beneﬁ  ts of rising food prices for smallholders in the developing 
world? How should agricultural trade policies and subsidy schemes be 














Given the prospect of increased price instability, develop innovative 
ﬁ  nancial instruments – such as a virtual grain reserve bank and global 
credit facilities – to buffer net food-importing countries from price 
ﬂ  uctuations in imported food.
Markets should be calmed with the use of market-oriented regulation of 
speculation and shared public grain stocks with a “virtual” grain reserve bank, 
which would operate as a futures market. Further measures worth exploring are 
strategic grain reserves and global credit facilities for low-income, food-deﬁ  cit 
countries.
GESolution 5
Invest more money in the development of new crop varieties and the 
promotion of new technologies to set off a second “green revolution.”
There is considerable scope for much higher yields in food crops. A new 
generation of technologies in rice, maize and wheat has the potential to lay
5
To reduce the ﬁ  scal burden and avoid the diversion of government funds for 
crucial investment projects, foreign aid should also become more adjustable to 
ﬁ  nance social protection programs in times of emergency. Local governments 
should also scale up investments for sustained agricultural growth.
GESolution 3
Eliminate policy measures that distort agricultural prices in both 
developed and developing countries.
Agricultural subsidies, including subsidies for biofuels, as well as other trade 
barriers for agricultural products in developed countries need to be eliminated. 
Agricultural protectionism seems to be main cause of the massive distortion in 
global food markets. At the same time, developing countries should avoid price 
controls on food products and restrictions on food exports, especially during 
crises.
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As long as energy prices increase in parallel with agricultural prices, there is 
a broad problem of economic development in poor countries and hence of 
overcoming poverty and malnutrition.
If food prices are to be stabilized in the long run, any sustainable policy measures 
must aim to increase agricultural production. To do so effectively, governments 
must avoid policies that distort prices and hence incentives for producers 
of agricultural products. Prevailing agricultural protectionism in developed 
countries prevents specialization according to comparative advantage and thus 
causes global welfare losses and depressed incentives for farmers in developing 
countries.
In addition, in some developing countries, price controls and export restrictions 
discourage farmers to produce more. Liberalized food markets would send a 
strong signal to farmers and reinforce a big supply response to the recent hike 
in food prices. They would also help to make the international market larger 
and thus less volatile, and to promote rural development in vast parts of the 
developing world. Encouraging self-reliance rather than self-sufﬁ  ciency is an 
effective response to times of extraordinary stress.
5
the foundations for a second “green revolution.” More funds will be needed to 
ensure rapid adoption and promote better crop management practices to reduce 
the gap between achieved and potential yield.
GESolution 6
Create job and income opportunities, which is a more powerful way of 
ﬁ  ghting poverty and malnutrition than reducing food prices.
Poverty and malnutrition are primarily a problem of income and market access. 
Thus, policies to reduce poverty and malnutrition should focus primarily on this 
problem. The solutions are ways to prevent food prices from disrupting people´s 
living standards, particularly those of the urban poor in developing countries. 
But they are no substitute for policies that address the root causes of poverty 
and malnutrition.
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6. The Crisis of 














Support infrastructure investment to increase the supply of water 
for farmers, households and industries, particularly in developing 
countries.
R&D of new technologies, such as nanotechnology-based ﬁ  lters and desalination 
technologies, should be supported. Irrigation efﬁ  ciency in developing countries 
can often be improved through drip irrigation and precision agriculture and 
management changes, such as the adoption of demand-based irrigation 
scheduling systems. The accumulation of the underlying human and physical 
capital deserves support.
6
6. The Crisis 
 of  Water 
 Management 
Challenge
Clean freshwater is essential to sustain life, enable development and support 
a healthy environment. Because of population and economic growth, water 
demand for household, industrial and agricultural uses is increasing, while 
watersheds and irrigated land are deteriorating and ground and surface water 
pollution is increasing. In much of the developing world, growing urban and 
industrial water demand will require transfers of water from agricultural uses, 
threatening food production and rural livelihoods.
Historically, increasing water demand has been met by developing new sources 
of water. But the economic and environmental costs of developing new sources 
make this approach unsustainable for fully meeting future growth needs. 
Instead, policy-makers need to work towards making existing irrigation and 
water supply systems more efﬁ  cient, equitable and environmentally benign.
The emerging water crisis has global dimensions but solutions have to be mostly 
local. They need to be tailored to the speciﬁ  c natural, cultural, economic and 














Promote the increase crop output per unit of water input, through R&D 
leading to better crop cultivars (including drought resistance), better 
farm management and better soil water storage.
Water storage can be improved through better use of groundwater, water 
harvesting on small plots, small irrigation schemes fed by small reservoirs 
and, in some cases, large dams. In tropical sub-Saharan Africa, investment in 
infrastructure could solve most water problems, but this is not the case in Asia, 
where countries are physically water-scarce.
In rain-fed areas, the full potential of agriculture could be exploited through 
support for investments in water harvesting technologies and crop breeding 
targeted to rain-fed environments. 
6
GESolution 2
Provide policy support for water recycling, reuse and leak repair.
Industrial and irrigation water recycling can be a major source of water savings 
in many countries. Domestic water use can be made more efﬁ  cient by measures 
ranging from leak repair in municipal systems to installation of low-ﬂ  ow 
showerheads. 
Government support is also desirable to expand the safe reuse of water, 
particularly in agriculture, through improved drainage and water cleanup. Reuse 
technologies can also be applied to developing regions. For example, stand-
alone satellite treatment systems can treat wastewater, and small solar-powered 
membrane units can treat river water (such as those used in small villages in 
Kenya and India). 
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To most people, water is a public good, like air. Yet in practice, its proper 
management and distribution raise inherent challenges of allocation, which is 
where economic principles can help. Supplying water costs money. Moreover, 
although water is a renewable resource, it is fragile and can be spoiled.
There are various demands made of water, from farming to industry 
and household consumption, which diverge between OECD and 
non-OECD countries. 
Around 50 countries, with roughly a third of the world´s population, suffer 
from medium or high water stress, and 17 of these extract more water annually 
than is recharged through their natural water cycles. The strain affects surface 
freshwater bodies like rivers and lakes, but it also degrades groundwater 
resources.
With populations growing, these stresses will intensify. Over the past 50 years, 
global water withdrawal has quadrupled while world population doubled. 
Global water withdrawal is likely to increase by 31% between 1995 and 2020. 
By 2015, one in ﬁ  ve people will live in big cities, compared with one in nine 
today, and urban populations in developing countries will have doubled by 
2025. Many urban piped water systems are unreliable and all require large 
investments. 6
GESolution 4
Improve water governance worldwide, through transparent water 
property rights, water pricing and movement toward free agricultural 
trade. 
All countries of the world need to have transparent water property rights, 
permitting all users equal access to water at the same prices. In particular, the 
water market should not be segmented into agriculture, drinking, environmental 
uses and so on. Agricultural water pricing reform that establishes water rights 
for users is beneﬁ  cial, protecting farmers against arbitrary changes in water 
allocation and providing a basis for water trading among farmers and across 
sectors. 
An international freshwater market should be developed further, with a 
transparent water trading system (possibly with a commodities futures market 
for water of standardized quality), coupled with government regulation and 
protection of the poor. 
A water-scarce world requires concrete steps to be taken internationally to have 
open agricultural trade.
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Households account for just 8% of global water abstraction. The heaviest 
water user globally is agriculture, which is responsible for about 69% of 
total freshwater abstraction (of which 45% accrues to the OECD countries). 
Worldwide agricultural demand for water will continue to grow, but industry 
is likely to be the fastest growing water user overall, particularly in developing 
countries. For most countries, irrigation water represents over 80% of total 
agricultural water use. Water use for irrigation continues to grow.
Industry accounts for 23% of global water abstraction. But demand is expected 
to double over the next two decades. Industrial abstraction has declined in 
OECD countries largely as a result of efﬁ  ciency gains. The most water-intensive 
industries include pulp and paper, chemicals, and food and beverages.
One consequence of rising demand is scarcity. The global per capita availability 
of freshwater has dropped from 17,000 m3 a year in 1950 to 7,300 m3 in 1995. 
There are now more people in the world, of course, but there has also been a 
decline in available uncontaminated freshwater resources. This scarcity is not just 
on the surface: groundwater abstraction is beginning to exceed replenishment 
in some locations. 
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